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The Political Economic Pre-requisites of the 2011 Arab 
Uprisings: The Cases of Tunisia and Egypt 
 
Khalil F. Dagher 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt launched the Arab Spring in 2011. Many experts 
have tried to explain the root causes of these uprisings and predict their democratization 
prospects. This thesis claims that the economic dimension is the main cause of the 
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, and the Arab Spring more generally. Neoliberal 
economic policies adopted in the liberalization period in Tunisia and Egypt constituted 
a failed state-led development paradigm. The economies of both countries achieved 
positive growth rates over years, yet sustainable development was not reached. In 
addition, authoritarian governance facilitated the emergence of crony capitalism, where 
rent derived from economic growth did not trickle down to all social structures. The 
adopted development model was linked to the global economy through political and 
economic channels, which translated continuous cyclical economic downturns. The 
thesis also proposes policy recommendations for a new development paradigm in the 
Arab world. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ECONOMIC DISPARITIES TOPPLE DOWN 
REGIMES 
1.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the consequent emergence 
of a uni-polar world, the economic and political literature focused on the repercussions 
of this power shift on development paradigms. The capitalist economic system, 
accompanied by liberal political, social and cultural institutions, unevenly reshuffled the 
periphery’s economic and political arenas. Local, regional, and international 
relationships have been created virtually, facilitating the penetration of new production 
and consumption patterns, aligned with hybrid sets of political cultures (Greene & 
Kuswa, 2012). This created correlational relationships matrices where the model could 
not stand unless some other facilitating variables helped this one-way ‘outside – inside’ 
penetration.  
Periphery states became tied to a centralized decision making prototype ruled by 
the core; neoliberal economic and socio-political policies shaped a new development 
model through agents represented by international financial institutions and 
multinational corporations infiltrating periphery states and implanting models of 
governance leading to static sustainable dependency (Woods, 2013). 
States in the Arab region with their blend of high and low growth rates, fall in 
the periphery of the global capitalist system. Moreover, and despite its substantial 
natural resources, the Arab world is penetrated by Western institutions and states. 
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Neocolonial ties were created in the post-independence period to seize control over the 
largest oil and natural gas reserves in the globe. This overlapped with authoritarian 
regimes choking the freedoms of the Arab people.  
This thesis claims that neoliberal economic policies adopted in the economic 
liberalization period in Tunisia and Egypt caused negative implications on the social 
and economic levels. It argues that economic factors played an important role in the 
explosion of the popular uprisings due to accumulation effects over the decades under 
authoritarian political systems and faulty economic policies. The 2011 uprisings in 
Tunisia and Egypt have been associated with classical factors existing in the literature 
on Middle East authoritarianism, such as the role of external actors and trans-regional 
networks, authoritarian upgrading processes, and the emerging role of social media. In 
contrast, the argument presented in this thesis suggests that economic policy choices 
made decades ago facilitated a linear social deterioration accompanied by a vertical 
stratification, fragmentation of social structures, and an increase in the gap between the 
rich and the poor. Therefore, the thesis claims that the main variable behind the Arab 
uprisings is the neoliberal economic model adopted in Tunisia and Egypt, rather than 
issues of governance (authoritarianism) which comes as a complementary variable. 
Erroneous economic models are thus the main explanation of the uprising, 
whereas other variables (social media, popular upset, oppression…) served as triggers. 
In short, the Arab uprising is the result more of a de-facto but faulty development 
paradigm, than a consequence of authoritarian governance models. These economic 
models missed to link with advancement in human development achieved over time 
(Kuhn, 2012):  
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 “The transformative events of the Arab Spring offer a unique 
opportunity to reassess the human dimensions of political change…No 
other developing region had seen such improvements in multiple 
indicators of human development, reflected in declining child mortality, 
increased schooling, increased physical stature of women, and increased 
longevity… Advances in human development contributed to a 
fundamental reordering of the relationship between citizen and state. 
Human development fostered a set of higher expectations, both 
physiologically and socially determined, that placed considerable 
pressure on governments, particularly in the context of extended 
adolescence” (Kuhn, 2012, p. 674).  
 
Non-inclusive economic models adopted in the Arab region developed their seed 
of self-destruction over time. The human factor has been underestimated 
whereas it emerged in 2011 as a major destabilizing factor. 
 
1.2  From Economic Marginalization to Discontent and Uprising  
The era of state led development paradigms did not bring any distinguished 
progress to the people in the Arab World. Based on the adopted socio-economic pacts, 
any state driven project has been channeled through the ruling elites’ businesses and 
interests facilitating the emergence of a crony capitalistic closed circle.  
The 2011 Arab Human Development report highlights that the population of the 
Arab countries grew more than double between 1975 and 2005 to reach 314 million. 
The report highlights that youth consisted the biggest fraction of this demographic 
growth. Having said so, the Arab region has been living a demographic bomb for 
decades. In this regards: 
 “Economic hardship can be tolerated if the people believe there is a 
better future ahead, or feel that the pain is at least somewhat equally 
distributed Neither has been the case in the Arab world, where the state 
led development gave place to crony capitalism that benefited only a 
small minority. In Egypt, new business elites collaborated with the 
regime to amass fortunes unimaginable to the majority of the population 
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surviving on a $2 a day. In Tunisia, no investment deal was closed 
without a kick back to the ruling family” (Manfreda, 2011, p. 1)  
 
What happened in Tunisia in 2011 highlighted the failure of the political system to 
provide minimum social welfare to its citizens, not only in Tunisia, but also in other 
countries with formerly populist authoritarian regimes, notably Egypt (Öztürkler, 2013). 
The incident uncovered “the fractures in political and economic systems in the region” 
(Öztürkler, 2013, p. 3).  
The Arab spring in 2011 came after four years of the eruption of the global 
financial crises which uncovered the existing deficiencies of the current global 
capitalistic economic model. The effects of the 2007 global financial crises, described 
as the worst financial crisis since the great depression in the past decade, led to an 
increase in global food prices. Given the nature of the economic systems of the region, 
as import oriented rentier economies, poor social classes have been left vulnerable to 
the emerging inflation wave from overseas. Tunisia and Egypt’s social structures were 
shocked brutally due to the state of food insecurity both countries face. 
“The economic factors behind the Arab Spring were unfair income 
distribution, widespread poverty, and unemployment of the young and 
educated, corruption and cronyism. For years, autocratic governments 
either totally rejected demands for reform or took temporary and 
insufficient measures. Rising food inflation forced millions of the poor to 
live at or below subsistence levels. The highest percent income group in 
Tunisia received 47.9 percent of the country’s total income, while the 
lowest 20 percent received 5.9 percent of the total income in 2009. In 
Egypt, those rates were 40.3 percent and 9.4 percent respectively” 
(Öztürkler, 2013, p. 6).  
 
People revolting for their livelihood have been always a cause of economic 
policies. As in George Orwell in Animal Farm, repression, exploitation, and poverty are 
the driving forces behind toppling down autocratic leaders.      
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1.3  Research Question 
What was the impact of neoliberal economic models on authoritarian regimes in 
Tunisia and Egypt? The answer to this question requires the evaluation of the 
macroeconomic choices taken in both countries during the liberalization period. Hence, 
studying the socio economic effects of favoring nonproductive sectors, such as services 
and tourism, over the productive sectors, agriculture and industry, in terms of 
employment rates and contribution to the GDP, is the starting point of this thesis. 
Attention should be drawn here to the role of international financial institutions, such as 
the World Bank and IMF, on one hand, and the impact institutionalizing structural 
adjustments on methods of governance, development models, and existing linkages with 
the rest of the world on the other.  
The choice of Tunisia and Egypt as country case studies is based on different 
factors. First, these two countries were the spark of the Arab Spring. Moreover, Tunisia 
and Egypt were considered the economic miracles of neoliberal economic models by 
international financial institutions. Lastly, the economies of Tunisia and Egypt have a 
rentier nature: external revenues such as aid and remittances are critical to GDP growth. 
Both countries hence represent good cases to test economic vulnerability to external 
shock, and its overall effect on social levels. These two cases support the main claim of 
this thesis: that the uprisings were rooted in mainly economic basis causes.   
The next step illustrates how the transition – towards the liberalization of the 
economy – occurred. An examination of a newly installed model is required. In addition 
the political performance of regimes must be taken into consideration to evaluate 
whether liberalizing the economy trickled down social benefits at the grass root level. 
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Lastly, the distribution of the labor force within the liberalized economy will be traced 
in an attempt to examine the social dimension of employment policies and its 
relationship with social services. Theses policy choices are evaluated in terms of 
political gains, economic rent, and their overall effects on the social level. 
1.4  Methodology  
This thesis examines how macro-economic policy choices generated trickle 
down crises at the domestic levels. After evaluating liberalization as policy choices, the 
analysis will evaluate the impacts and outputs, on the longer term from a general 
developmental perspective, using specific social and economic indicators, in an attempt 
to draw correlations with the political outcome of authoritarian breakdown in 2011. 
Hence political deterioration should be related to economic shocks
1
 in order to show 
how liberalization policies exposed the domestic economy to outside shocks, leading 
economic factors to cause social deterioration, and hence trigger a political crisis. 
Consequently, the outcome highlighted by this thesis is the unseen socio-economic 
causes that caused the unexpected collapse of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Despite 
their limitations, indicators such as GDP, and GDP per capita, demographic distribution 
of labor force (men, woman, youth), access to social services (education and health), 
Human Development Index, will reflect a quantitative review of economic performance. 
Yet, these indicators will not reflect the qualitative side related to social improvement.  
Capitalistic economic models (in Tunisia and Egypt) are examined from a 
critical perspective to demonstrate that this model lacked justice and equity, and raised 
                                                          
1
External Economic Shocks: An external shock is an unexpected change in an economic variable which 
takes place outside the economy. An example might be an increase in the price of oil having an impact on 
firm's costs of production.  
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disparities and inequalities among the people. Hence, critical theory would allow the 
examination of the revolutionary process in Tunisia and Egypt caused by a capitalistic 
neoliberal economic model, and draw implications using existing linkages with the 
international system.  
To answer the questions raised in this thesis, an analytical study on three main 
levels will be undertaken: The first level evaluates the national economic policy-making 
in Tunisia and Egypt and effects on social wellbeing in the post liberalization period. 
Some indicators will be used in this context: GDP and GDP per capita for economic 
activity, education, and unemployment rates to capture the social dimension. For 
instance, quantitative measures of GDP and GDP per capita were proven inefficient and 
non-representative to evaluate the outputs of neoliberal economic policies (Joffé, 2011). 
Hence, analysis will focus on the policies as main determinants of the livelihoods of the 
people. For decades, international development institutions and governments resorted to 
these indicators to measure progress. Yet, and given their quantitative nature, progress 
was captured at its nominal value. This thesis will use the same indicators, to prove 
their limitation. A nominal increase in the GDP, or GDP per capita does not necessary 
entail improvement in the livelihoods of people.   
The second level of analysis consists of conducting a cross country comparison 
of the outcomes of economic liberalization policy in Tunisia and Egypt. The parameters 
of such a comparison are the following: vulnerability of local economies to external 
shocks, and the distribution of wealth: clientalism, rentierism, oppression, and injustice.. 
The resources used in this study rely on reports of existing international organization 
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and academic literatures tackling the political economy of authoritarianism in Tunisia 
and Egypt in light of the Arab spring. 
The third level of analysis will dissect the international dimension of economic 
crises. It will trace the structural deficiency in the international system and governance 
models, and the extent to which international economic crises affect local vulnerable 
economies. This research is based on existing literature surveys of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of key indicators (GDP, GDP per Capita, Human Development 
Index, Contribution of Aid and Remittances to GDP, Employment) from both the 
academic and practical fields. This will allow drawing trends of socio-economic gains 
and opportunity costs. Later, an illustration of some policy implications of the Arab 
Spring will be made in an attempt to sketch the aspired new development paradigm. It is 
worth noting that existing data sets and primary research captured by international 
organizations (World Bank and IMF) tracing economic and social performance of 
developing countries is the major source of this information. The analysis of these data 
sets is carried out through holistic indicators developed by these organizations. The 
sources consulted in this research use the mentioned data sets and indicators.  
The expected results of such an analysis should reflect contradicting scenarios: 
nominal increase in GDP growth over time, wider access to education and social 
services, and unsustainable social and economic development resulting in increased 
unemployment and inequality rates. Further, attention should be driven to economic 
growth models adopted that in both Tunisia and Egypt’s cases and their inability to 
generate economic development. The quality of growth in both countries in light of neo-
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liberal policies is thus questionable in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of these 
economies. A development paradigm shift is consequently a necessity.   
1.5  Map of the Thesis  
This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first chapter introduces a general 
overview of the popular uprisings that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. This 
overview provides another explanation to the uprising by relying on economic policy 
analysis which is argued to be the main determinant of the political crises. Moreover, it 
traces the unseen event over time and relates it to the macroeconomic policy choices 
adopted in the post liberalization period in both countries. The second chapter examines 
theoretical debate of the literature by highlighting different scenarios on authoritarian 
breakdown. Moreover, this chapter revisits neo-liberal policies and models from a neo-
Marxist perspective. As for the third and the fourth chapters, two case studies of Tunisia 
and Egypt unpack the effects of macroeconomic economic policy in each country, and 
thus studding underlying effects on the social and political levels. Lastly, the fifth 
chapter highlights key findings and results, with a great focus on the dynamics of the 
uprising in both countries, while bringing policy findings on how should the new 
development paradigm look like.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE POPULAR UPRISINGS: THE FALL OF 
SUSTAINABILITY  
 
 
2.1  Introduction: The Arab Uprisings from another Angle 
This chapter surveys non-economic explanations, claimed by the thesis as 
explanatory and complementary variables. Hence, the non-economic factors facilitated 
the synthesis of the uprisings, and thereafter authoritarian breakdown. These factors 
should be analyzed at two main levels and themes: (1) governance models under 
authoritarianism and (2) authoritarian breakdown. Governance models represent 
liberalization without democratization attempts. Reductionist and faulty economic 
liberalization instead of social and political reform led to failed democratization 
paradigms. Further, authoritarian break down came after long years of structural 
financial adjustments seen by the literature as one of the main reasons behind 
authoritarian persistence. It has been claimed that these types of adjustments ensured 
durable authoritarian rule and made it difficult to predict any probable breakdown.  
While putting both literatures into question, this thesis provides more economic 
explanations to the uprising by arguing that western economic development models 
imposed during the liberalization period jeopardized governance models, and therefore 
instead of upgrading authoritarianism, cracked its foundations at the social level, and 
hence diffused a new political outcome. Analyzing the role of external actors and trans-
regional networks, in addition to the role of civil society and the public sphere 
highlights the existing literature’s deficiency in terms of governance models and 
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authoritarian breakdown. This chapter builds on the available literature to provide 
another explanation for the Arab Spring from a different angle.  While trying to bridge 
between this literature and the main claim of the thesis, an analytical qualitative model 
is drawn to present a logical explanatory framework of the breakdown. 
 
2.2  Governance Models under Authoritarianism: Liberalization 
without Democratization 
 
Zooming on the Middle East necessitates a matrix analytical framework to 
understand the level of complexity that characterizes this region. Since the end of the 
Cold War, the emerging world order has been performing as a centralized unit of 
decision making crafting and executing models of governance for the rest of the world. 
The approach towards this part of the world varied from the stick to the carrot several 
times, based on who was shaping global economic models. The role of external actors 
and trans-regional networks in shaping the domestic politics of the region’s states is 
cardinal. Hence, this role is explained here through one important variable: the 
democracy promotion model in the region and its local, regional, and international 
contexts.  
Democracy promotion is not that recent in the region, rather, it has been a major 
product packaged by the US for local consumption in the Middle East. As a global 
economic and military hegemon, the US has been working on implanting such a 
product, through building a collective political culture facilitating its absorption, and 
fitting it to local contexts; this new political culture has been tailored to fit the purpose 
of the producer, and not the needs of the consumer, through a post-cold war strategy 
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shaped by a group of intellects and writers, and maintained by regional ties represented 
by monarchical and autocratic allies (Blecher, 2003).  
Despite the ‘noble’ cause behind democratization, regional actors invested 
wrong means to ensure sustainability in the region; the regional enforcers, and instead 
of being partners in the change, played a distracting role, which created a stagnant status 
quo for the benefit of authoritarian persistence (Dune, 2009). At the domestic level, the 
means did not differ much in terms of efficacy and effectiveness. In this context, 
authoritarian persistence was mainly seen as a result of institutional deficiencies in the 
governance model where regimes opened political participation by ensuring that 
outcomes are always contained (Hydemann, 2010). Hence, unseen regime fractures 
have been uncovered to the public, and spread through global broadcast networks and 
social media channels. Information channels, and despite censorship attempts, have 
been a powerful facilitator to shake global public opinion, and hence fragment closed 
regimes (Lynch, 2011). 
The democratization literature examined the role of civil society and its 
underlying effect in reshaping the public sphere in an attempt to explain the persistence 
of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. The analysis tried to answer two 
fundamental questions: (1) what went wrong on the social level (why did CSO’s fail to 
promote democratization?), and (2) what policy shifts or tactics did regimes use to 
maintain the status quo, and hence escape the third wave of democratization? On the 
societal level, it may be first illustrative to sketch the emergence of these organizations 
and the role they were assuming to play at the public level.  
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When authoritarian regimes liberalized the political arena, many organizations 
emerged under themes related to human rights and demanded political participation. 
However, already existing NGOs in addition to new ones, were not able to capture the 
benefits of such an opportunity due to lack of capacities (Hydemann, 2010). Moreover, 
the weakness of existing political parties (if any) tempted these organizations to play a 
role they were not ready for and to operate in a context that is not meant for them 
(Langohr, 2004). Yet, and although these groups were the secular voice in society, 
promoting change and advocating human rights, NGOs lacked the basic political 
knowledge to engage in domestic politics. This decreased the chances of 
democratization, despite the fact that participation in the political process was broader 
than before (Langohr, 2004).  
Opening political participation was a tactic used by authoritarian regimes to 
maintain their rule. Having said so, analyzing why some Middle East states escaped the 
third wave of democratization necessitates a deep analysis of state-society relation, and 
the role of associational politics in the maintenance of the authoritarian status quo. Civil 
society in this sense was used to preserve the regime. Political participation was allowed 
to neutralize the effect of any potential political opposition at one hand, and was 
channeled to civil society which lacks any threatening political weight (Langohr, 2004; 
Moore & Salloukh, 2007; Hydemann, 2010) Escaping the third wave of democracy was 
hence due to (1) prudent moves authoritarian regimes have taking through associational 
politics (Moore & Salloukh, 2007), in addition to other complementing internal and 
external factors such as (2) economic rent, the Arab Israeli conflict, economic 
liberalization, and the lack of a developed class structure (Mahdi, 2009).  
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In an attempt to provide viable explanations of the uprising it is important for 
scholars to adjust and reexamine their theories. As the domestic scene is in the process 
of crystalizing, the West and especially the United States should drop adopting a double 
standards agenda. After all, an international system that abuses the rights of the masses 
promotes for corruption and clientalism (Shokr & Kamat, 2011). Hence, a new 
development paradigm should be tailored locally, oriented by sound inclusive social and 
economic policies.     
 
2.2.1 The Role of External Actors and Trans-Regional Networks 
 
The absence of a third wave of democratization in the Middle East forced 
political scientists to examine the reasons behind authoritarian persistence. The cultural 
approach suggested answers rooted in religion, culture, and old traditional governance 
practices that may increase the immunity of these regimes to change. Perhaps post-
colonial states, as newly established states, were not mature enough to democratize. The 
important point to make here is that these states inherited from colonialism complex 
sectarian and cultural stratifications at state and society levels, in light of the existing 
horizontal and vertical divisions in the region.  
From a geopolitical perspective, the Middle East contains the world’s largest 
reserve of oil and natural resources. Furthermore, nature blessed the Middle East with a 
diversified geography at the center of a strategic trade and exchange channel. This 
means that the great powers of the West, and especially the US, would have interest in 
the region. Arab Israeli wars facilitated an ideological and political division among 
competing states, which portrayed an important aspect of the conflict. Hence, regional 
15 
 
interests (economic, security, political…) would definitely need regional and local 
protégés. These regional and local actors are authoritarian regimes allied with the US 
and the West, working to preserve their survival, and secure foreign interests. The 
persistence of authoritarianism is presented by this section from the angle of external 
actors and trans-regional networks, and the impact of the roles played at regional and 
local levels. The literature reviewed has tackled the failure of imported democracy 
promotion projects, mainly US and Western models while spotting the light of their 
specific dynamics and effects. 
 
2.2.2 Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: a “Laissez Faire” for 
Authoritarianism? 
 
External democracy promotion attempts to break authoritarian persistence in the 
region have been a failure. The 2011 popular uprisings in the Arab World proved that 
change comes from within when it comes to self-determination. Further, self-
determination includes the right and the obligation to craft governance and development 
models from local contexts. Yet, external assistance is acceptable as long as it does not 
affect sovereignty. Military activity and socio-economic and political dictation brought 
fragmentation and crises to the region which challenged any democratic change 
prospect. 
In light of the lack of evident and clear explanations on the war on Iraq, the 
Bush Administration found itself forced to create new rhetoric about democracy 
promotion to convince public opinion (Blecher, 2003). The war was a risky game since 
the US was uncertain about the future of democracy in the region, and most importantly 
it was uncertain about the security of its interests (Dune, 2009). Moreover, the 
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persistence of authoritarianism later on, proved a backlash against democracy 
promotion which would require a reassessment of the situation (Hydemann, 2010). 
Dunne (2009) argued that Arabs need democratization to solve their internal economic, 
political and social problems, for that reason the US would encounter some 
opportunities and challenges in applying its democracy agenda. On the other hand, 
Heydemann (2010) clearly states that the ME did not prove any single case of 
democratization despite all pressures of reform.  
The US miscalculated the war on Iraq, under slogans of democracy and 
freedom, but the opposite occurred. Heydemann (2010) and Dune (2009) used 
empirically oriented research to prove two different explanations of democratization 
failure. Heydemann analyzed the persistence of authoritarianism and the policy shifts 
under authoritarian rule, whereas Dune used a comparative study for the cases of Egypt, 
Morocco, and Bahrain where the US pushed for democracy. In Heydemann’s approach, 
upgrading authoritarianism was the key to sustainability of the regimes. This entailed 
internal neutralization of the pressures coming from the outside. Dunne goes beyond 
this and argues that external actors – mainly US pressures – pushed undemocratic allies 
to reform without risking US interests (win-win situation). Dunne also states that 
democratic reforms can sometimes (in the Islamist’s case) provoke an unpleasant result 
for the US if Islamists’ presence expands (they can rise with pragmatic agendas). 
According to Hydemann (2010), if authoritarian upgrading results some reforms with 
social benefits, regimes would definitely choke political participation in maintain status 
quo.   
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It is a general point of agreement that the war on Iraq brought instability, 
sectarian conflicts, civil violence, and over all unrest to the country with significant 
regional repercussions. This is usually the case when democracy is brought ‘out of the 
barrel of a gun’, as Blecher (2003) argues. Blecher believes that political culture can be 
remade by allowing Iraqis to make their right democratic choices (democracy domino 
theory) but in fact, democracy can sometimes mislead the Arab people. Moreover, the 
author states that the US would not accept the choice of the Arab people since these 
choices are always reversed (the elections in Gaza strip and the rise of Hamas; the post 
Arab Spring Egyptian elections and the success of the Muslim Brother hoods). Dunne 
(2009) criticizes the democracy promotion project by making three objections: (1) 
democracy cannot be brought by coercion, (2) impossibility to bring democracy in the 
ME while maintaining non democratic regimes alliance, and (3) if democracy prevailed 
Islamists can emerge which is unfavorable for US interests. According to Heydemann 
(2010), the ability of the US and western countries trying to promote democracy in the 
ME is weak, and democracy is best achieved through going into reform processes and 
strategies. The three point of views presented by Blecher (2003), Dune (2009), and 
Heydemann (2010) reflect the existing deficiency in the literature on democratic 
transition and authoritarian persistence / breakdown. All of the three authors pointed 
that democracy should not be imported (with or without wars/violence) and has to be 
locally made. The support of arguments yet differs based on different perspectives of 
the analysis at three different times. An important aspect to be made here is that the 
more recent the literature was, the less it tackled democracy through wars. Furthermore, 
this has been a result of the lessons learned from the war of Iraq in 2003, and the change 
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in the American politics towards the region and the extent to which the political 
literature has been adapting towards. Dunne (2009) has presented viable objections 
towards democracy promotion program where change from within through reform is 
simply the pathway through democratic transition process in light of the current events 
in the post Arab Spring period.       
At the regional level, the US democracy promotion program was accused by 
having political and security goals (Blecher, 2003; Dune, 2009). Dune (2009) saw 
democracy promotion adopted by the Bush administration as a step to rearrange the 
strategic balance in the region. Blecher considered the American intervention in Iraq far 
from democratization and very close to “addressing security related issues for Israel, the 
stability of moderate Arab regimes, and the free flow of oil”. Moreover, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran through its allies in the region, states (the Syrian Regime) and non-
states actors (Hizbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Al Mahdi Army in Iraq), 
represents a serious threat to Israel and to the interests of the United Stated in the 
region. At the same time, Iran is one of the important oil producers in the region and in 
case of any security developments prices of oil would skyrocket, which does not favor 
the US nor western countries. Furthermore, the sphere of the cold war between Iran and 
the US has been widening for the past decade, and the Syrian ongoing civil war is the 
most recent. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq, and the 
transitional withdrawal from Afghanistan, wouldn’t occur without a division of interests 
and shares. As the Arab Spring countries pass through a transitional period, the Middle 
East region will still witness soft and hard hit and run rounds between competing 
powers.        
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Marc Lynch (2011) added to the study of the ME politics a new kind of 
literature. The role of online information challenging authoritarian Arab states, where 
Egypt is taken as a case study, Lynch reviews the role of social media relating to the 
recent development the Arab world is witnessing. Although the image in certain 
countries did not crystallize perfectly, and it is hard to say that democracy prevailed or 
not, social media and online information were considered as triggers of the uprisings.   
According to Lynch (2011), Arab states evolved particularly large and 
oppressive apparatuses for state control, surveillance, repression, bureaucracies, 
inwardly focused armies, massive intelligence services, and strong role for international 
patrons. For that, the author presents four ways by which new media can challenge the 
power of Arab states: (1) promoting contentious collective action – mainly increasing 
the efficiency and effectiveness off protests, (2) limiting or enhancing the mechanism of 
state repression – internet activists in Egypt defeated state’s control over the flaw of 
information despite all virtual security the regime was applying, (3) affecting 
international support for the regime, and (4) affecting the overall control of the public 
sphere.                   
The Neo-Conservatives’ agenda on democracy promotion by coercion have 
failed. Iraq did not turn into a democracy as Georges W. Bush promised. In light of the 
failure of the military campaign on Iraq, it has been claimed that the whole war was a 
business deal for the Neo-Conservative, stakeholders, and traders of arms and oil 
companies. Other may claim it was for security reasons with an eye on the Iraqi oil on 
one hand, and on the other to deter the emerging Iranian power. After nine years of 
occupation, the American troops withdrew from Iraq after a bloody war, with a cost of 
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trillions of dollars, and pushed the American economy into stagnation. Obama’s 
administration learned from the experience and mistakes of the precedents, and this 
would explain the denial from their allies during the popular uprisings.                                  
The popular uprisings in the Arab world have demonstrated that the free people 
decide what they want. Change therefore comes from within, and imported programs 
will always fall. Each and every case in the Arab World has its own scenario and 
context, but for sure, the wall of fear has collapsed in the Arab world, and this itself is a 
giant step towards the democratization  Arab people have been long waiting for. 
     
2.2.3 Role of Civil Society and Public Sphere 
The Middle East escaped three waves of democratization. Writers were trying to 
explain the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the ME for sometimes until the 
recent development has occurred. The literature on the Arab Spring has been trying to 
adapt in an attempt to draw possible prospects for democracy in the region. In this 
concern, a major question has been raised: why is the region still immune from 
democracy? Many authors considered it an issue of religion and culture, while others 
drew complex explanatory models with social and economic patterns being as 
constraints in front of transition. The analysis in this section deals mainly with domestic 
politics factors, taking into consideration the role of external variables and their 
underlying effects at the local level.  
At the regional level, the conflict of interests of the great powers over the region 
can give some explanations about the persistence of authoritarian rule. Geopolitically 
speaking, the region has been passing through waves of wars and violence throughout 
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its modern history. The Arab-Israeli wars and its repercussions all over the region, and 
the inter-Arab wars, paved the vertical stratification in the region into two main camps. 
Further, the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a key regional actor, in 
addition to the mounting powers of its peripheries, the non-state actors, forced the pro-
western Sunnite regimes to re-organize themselves lines to overcome or neutralize the 
treat. In this context, the Gulf Area witnesses the emergence of allied Sunni monarchies 
in an economic, political, and military coalition under the name of Gulf Cooperation 
Committee (GCC).   
At the Domestic level, authoritarian ruling emerged in the post-independence 
period. The literature focused on major case studies from Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, 
Tunisia, and Egypt, where different scenarios have been drawn in an attempt to explain 
the persistence of authoritarianism.  Work of democracy deficiency in the region relied 
on several methodologies like historical sociology, and social and political 
transformation models. The tactics used for regime survival have been portrayed by 
political shifts and creation of closed social pacts seen through the perspective of state-
society relations. The role of social movements, civil society organizations, and public 
sphere varied from country to another, where the latter groups switched from playing 
the role of opposition to their normal role of advocacy in light of absence of political 
parties. The general feature that can be extracted from the literature is that regimes 
adopted strategies of liberalization without any desire to democratize. 
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2.2.4 LIBERALIZATION WITHOUT DEMOCRATIZATION: FLEXIBILITY, 
OVERLAP, AND STATUS QUO – THE CIVIL NEUTRALITY CASE   
 
Opening political participation allowed NGO’s and CSO’s to emerge as key 
players in the public arena. When Ben Ali came to power, he opened up in an attempt to 
reach democratization and Tunisian authorities signed a national pact about Tunisia’s 
dedication for democracy. Yet, the commitment was not realized when in the first 
elections Islamist groups were banned and repressed (Langohr, 2004). In the Palestinian 
Territories, the boycott of elections in 1996 led to channeling the opposition through 
NGOs and not political parties (Langohr, 2004). The Egyptian case is not that different, 
with the violence and repression of the Islamists after 1987. Jailing Muslim Brother 
Hood leaders in 1995 opened the arena for a new model of opposition mainly through 
NGO’s (Langohr, 2004). The de-facto democratization processes presented NGO’s as 
key if not sole political opposition at the domestic level.  
According to Langhor (2004), political scientists argue that opposition is 
through political parties, but the constraints put by governments forced activists to 
resort to NGOs. This underscores many key issues related to the weakness of political 
opposition parties in general. Oppression exercised by regimes, electoral fraud, and 
financial fragility are key features across the region preventing the existence of strong 
political parties compared to NGO’s (Langohr, 2004). Al Mahdi (2009) presented three 
reasons for the limitation Kifaya, in the case of Egypt, as an opposition movement: 
repression, political economic structure of authoritarianism (clientalism, selective use of 
force, rentierism), and the lack of political dynamics and experience. 
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Flexible authoritarianism as stated by Al Mahdi (2009) represents a key variable 
in the analysis of democratization in the ME. Authoritarianism persisted not only 
because of the robustness of regimes, but also because they used different tactics of 
absorption, like negotiation and accommodation, and political change and shifts, in 
addition to clientalism (Moore & Salloukh, 2007; Mahdi, 2009). Employment in public 
sectors, hegemony of the ruling elites, discerning use of compulsion and corporatism 
and influential clientatlist politics, with high incentives for non-participation, 
authoritarian regimes managed to neutralize all social classes (Mahdi, 2009). Through 
associational politics, the control of professional syndicates, in addition to their 
empowerment with economic benefits and rents, state society relations’ patterns have 
been defined, with a sustainable rentier and cliental base as in Jordan, Kuwait, and Syria 
(Moore & Salloukh, 2007). 
From Critical Theory’s perspective, the problem resides in the poor intellectual 
efforts that have been put to the diagnosis of authoritarianism in tracing the ways of 
democratic transition (Traboulsi, 2005). Beyond state society relations’, the social bases 
of these regimes have been tailored with tight social pacts in an attempt to ensure full 
domination. This rational builds upon Moore and Salloukh’s (2007) argument: through 
professional associations and their relations with political authority it can be possible to 
theorize about authoritarian regimes. In this context, the examination of the social pacts 
during authoritarian ruling may tell something about the long periods of status quo 
persistence. The ruling party’s social pact in Syria for instance have lasted for forty 
years, but has reached an expiry date where people decided to break the wall of fear and 
revolt upon. The closed social pacts under authoritarian rule allow regimes to assume 
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control over the society through state society relations governed by a security apparatus. 
Hence, authoritarian sustainability is a function of socio-economic discrimination, 
clientlism, political uniformity, and external support.  
Salloukh and Moore (2007) argue that: 
“Professional associations are artifacts of how regimes built their states 
and secured support from particular social bases (Syria: urban Sunni elite 
dominated business elite; Jordan: elite urban formed of members from 
Syria and Palestine; Kuwait: same social fabric as rulers with no 
significant divergence from state policies). Yet associations were also 
agents of change during decades when these regimes were under 
pressure” (Moore & Salloukh, 2007, p. 56). 
 
Moreover, the alteration of clans, ethnic groups and religious groups into political 
organizations has a straight outcome on the growth of a public sphere (Traboulsi, 2005). 
Hence, an artificial pro-regime public sphere and civil society – considered as a buffer 
zone and protégé for the regime - emerges as a result of the social pact created and 
adopted under authoritarianism. Therefore, and based on Moore and Salloukh (2007) 
argument, Arab civil society has been used to preserve regimes powers. 
Liberalization without democratization is a shared aspect of authoritarian 
governance in the Middle East. Opening the public and political arena, and widening 
the scope of participation was a permanent request by western allies and especially the 
US. Pushing for change has been stated out loud, but in reality, regimes such as 
Mubarak’s and others represented a regional periphery for the US foreign policy in the 
region. Repression after liberalization constrained local oppositions. In fact, the overlap 
between the functions of NGO’s as advocacy groups with external funds complicated 
the scene in light of weak and banned oppositions. Oppositions are better conducted 
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with political parties, who are if existed under such regimes, agents of authoritarian 
governors.  
Security dilemma, economic and fiscal crises, and external or internal threats 
from state or non-state actors could give authoritarian regimes legitimacy. It has always 
been the case that regimes created fake legitimacies on the bodies of their people. “The 
belief that a chronic fiscal crisis and waning popular support would lead regimes to 
loosen authoritarian controls and lead to democratization was proven wrong” (Moore & 
Salloukh, 2007, p. 1) .Moreover, groups seeking to change and challenge 
authoritarianism have to have a popular support along with nongovernmental advocacy 
(Langohr, 2004; Tarabulsi, 2005). Change necessitates the presentation of a robust 
popular influence in which violence cannot be always ruled out (Traboulsi, 2005). 
Sometimes the only bullet left in the hands of the masses is to revolt in order to push the 
democratization process from a broad level to the strategic level (Traboulsi, 2005). Last 
but not least, regional and international factors play important roles in domestic 
opposition in the ME (Mahdi, 2009).  
Perhaps the Arab Spring has demonstrated that authoritarian regimes are much 
more fragile than they may look. The popular apprising that took place in the Arab 
world, resulted so far in the collapse of major dictators, broke the wall of fear among 
the Arab masses. Moreover, the swift developments that occurred in Tunisia, created 
repercussions all over the region leading to a domino effect, and increased the 
vulnerability of other regimes with similar cases. In addition, social media and its role 
in promoting revolutionary ideas among the Arab youth is a facilitating factor that 
should be taken into account. Civil society in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrated strength 
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and good conduct of revolutionary action and may prove some writers of the literature 
wrong. But the last question remains, is democratization going to prevail? What is the 
role of military institutions? And to what extent can constitutional reform absorb the 
demands of the masses, and most importantly achieve rightful representation? 
 
2.3  From Persistence to Breakdown: What did the Literature Miss?   
 
The literature on Middle East authoritarianism has been dominated by the 
attempt to explain persistence and democratization prospects. The unforeseen popular 
uprisings caused experts to rethink their work and look for possible explanations. 
Moreover, this literature raised many questions as to why the Middle East escaped the 
third wave of democratization.2 The post Arab Spring literature tried to explain why 
scholars missed this event, and in what context can these uprisings be explained. 
Several explanations were presented, including institutional factors, external actors, 
social media, and fiscal and economic variables. This thesis digs deeper into the main 
claim that economic policy choices in the countries that witnessed the first uprisings, 
mainly Tunisia and Egypt, created economic and social deteriorations, leading to a 
political crisis and hence triggered the uprisings.  
While an intense examination of domestic factors was deployed to explain the 
status quo, the Arab Spring came debunk those ideas dominating the literature on 
authoritarianism in the Middle East. Moreover, some exogenous variables need to be 
                                                          
2
 In his book The Third Wave of Democratization, Huntington identifies a wave of democratization as a 
group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of 
time that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction. 1st wave: 1828-1926; 2nd wave: 
1942-1962; 3rd wave: started in 1974; after each wave, the number of democratic countries increased. 
Some observers claim that the current uprisings in the Middle East are a fourth wave of democratization 
based on this model
.  
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identified to understand the sudden change in the model, or in other ways, to revisit the 
analysis of the political landscape with all its respective milestones from another 
perspective. The literature on the Middle East focused on the persistence of 
authoritarianism, where writers analyzed the survival of regimes. Relying too much on 
the institutional explanations for authoritarian persistence and survival overestimated 
the strength of regimes and at the same time underestimated the role of mass 
mobilization driven by social media (Gause III, 2011). 
To explain what went wrong in the diagnosis, Gause (2011) identified five 
major areas where the literature on authoritarianism misread important factors: (1) the 
institutional strength of regime support – armies and ruling parties; (2) The effects of 
limited political contestations; (3) The economic bases of regime stability – neoliberal 
economics and oil wealth; (4) the effects of social media; (5) The regional infection 
effect that mutual Arab characteristics produces. Moreover, social and economic factors 
are important indexes to look at in an attempt to understand the demographical 
components of the uprising. The revolt was a common technique used by the people 
across the region, but the driving forces were not; in Tunisia, demands for restoration of 
the suspended constitution presented a main driving engine for the people to react, 
while in Egypt cross country strikes to topple the government were witnessed 
(Anderson, 2011).  The role of social media is important, but only as a trigger of more 
structural causes. The common call for dignity was shared by the revolutions but the 
divergence lays in the economic grievances and social dynamics (Anderson, 2011). 
While classifying demographical classes that undertook a revolutionary process, it is 
worth noting that the youth were the explosive mix that ignited and played the most 
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important role in the uprising (Shokr & Kamat, 2011). Moreover, Orientalists ideas 
about the ME, and the neoliberal rhetoric of American imperialism were brought down 
during the uprisings, to be replaced by revolutionary ideas of the Arab youth who were 
the engine of the mass mobilization (Shokr & Kamat, 2011). It is hence a combination 
of unseen internal and external factors that preceded the uprisings across the Arab 
World. 
 
2.3.1 The Unseen Fractures 
Gause (2011) called academics and experts on Middle East politics to readjust 
their understanding on the Arab region. While calling it the ‘Winter of Arab 
Discontent’, Gause (2011) focuses on important aspects that led to the emergence of the 
uprisings, but argues that no one predicted it before it happened. Regimes were assumed 
to contain and absorb the pressures generated by demographic change and social media. 
Moreover, the notion of Islam and culture was seen as a barrier against of democratic 
transition, but this notion was refuted by American Middle East specialists themselves. 
On the other hand, Anderson did admit that the uprising was not expected, but she 
relates a big role to the popular and massive demographic mobilization that made these 
uprisings pathways for change. This notion is also shared by Tarabulsi (2011) who calls 
them the demographic bomb, where unemployed youth rose against their regimes for 
change. 
The fast and sudden spread of the revolution in Tunisia has surprised everyone. 
Academics never thought that this would spread all over the Middle East. In fact Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan and Syria followed quickly. The protests were calling 
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for work and bread, and then later they asked for freedom and change when regimes 
repressed them gradually. Gulf monarchies increased their social welfare spending in 
order to neutralize any potential threat. Other regimes like Jordan contained the crisis 
quickly with small scale reforms and huge oppression. Things were much more 
complicated in Bahrain when Jazeera Shield entered Bahrain to crash the protest. In 
Syria and Yemen, things are more complicated; the upgrading process of 
authoritarianism did not work this time.   
 
2.3.2 Fiscal Authoritarian Upgrading: the Negative Economic Spill 
Over   
 
It is essential here to launch from an economic and social dimension to provide 
analysis for the uprising as it emerged as a call for jobs and social justice. Gause (2011) 
pointed to Steve Heydmann (2010) argument that Arab authoritarians upgraded their 
systems by seizing the profits of discriminatory economic alterations. However, the two 
most affected countries by popular uprisings were Tunisia and Egypt, adopting 
neoliberal economic policies. According to Gause (2011), those were destabilizing 
factors for autocratic regimes as these intensify inequality in society. Moreover, 
Anderson (2011) points out to the similarities in the economic policy between Mubarak 
and Ben Ali’s regimes. The growth in privatized institutions for the ruling elite on 
behalf of public sectors led to the monopolization of the resources in the hands of 
patronage and clientalist networks. Moreover, the productive sectors were totally 
neglected and emphasis was on foreign aid, tourism, and services which increased the 
vulnerability of the neediest. In addition, the Syrian case is not far from what Gause 
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(2011) and Anderson explained about economic policies. Tarabulsi (2011) correlates 
demographic growth and unemployment; the neoliberal economic approach adopted by 
Bashar al Asad transformed the Syria into a rentier economy, where bourgeoisie 
controls the economic activity mainly the private sector, while marginalizing the urban 
areas and rising the levels of unemployment and rural deprivation. As for Libya, the 
situation is more complex; Anderson (2011) describes it as a complete mess. Moamar al 
Kadafi established his consolidation power on the basis of patronage to kin and clan, 
which led to high levels of corruption. Lacking the least state requirements, Kadafi 
ruled Libya as a tribal community without putting any effort to build a state or society, 
for that reason the slip into a civil war was the a natural phenomenon.       
             
2.3.3 Demography: the Nerve of the Streets, and the Nightmare of 
Regimes 
 
According to Anderson (2011), the role of activism via social media is not new. 
Arab nationalism movements during the First World War were pretty much similar to 
the one playing in the current uprisings. Moreover, the importance of the current 
revolutions is not about the effects of globalization and technology on civic engagement 
techniques and popular aspirations, but rather is the reason why these aspirations and 
techniques were spread across the region. The demography of the protests is the element 
that needs to be studied. In Tunisia for instance, protests emerged from the neglected 
rural areas towards the capital allying with labor movements. In Egypt, urban and 
cosmopolitan young people in major cities organized the uprisings. As for Libya, bands 
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of armed rebels ignited the protests revealing the tribal and regional cleavages affecting 
the country.  
Tarabulsi (2011) also points to demography as the driving force and engine for 
change in the popular uprisings. Like Anderson (2011), he adds that the movements in 
Syria started in rural areas (like in Tunisia) where economic and social deprivation is 
high. Moreover, the youth in Yemen also assumed the largest burden of the protests. 
Tarabulsi (2011) explained demography from a wider perspective, where he claims that 
the surplus of educated youth were the explosive mix that refuted the claims that these 
youth would resort for violent Jihad. Moreover, Tarabulsi’s analysis intersects with 
Gause (2011) who claimed that the study of the Middle East was dominated by 
Orientalist dialectic, which was a main reason according to Gause for why scholars 
failed to predict the coming wave (2011). Beyond, Tarabulsi (2011) gives a class 
description of the demographic engine for change: the unemployed Arab educated 
moving towards change, supported by the middle class, whereas the capitalist sector 
remained confused and did not move since it has common interests with the regime. 
Taraboulsi supported the idea that change comes from within, where the power of the 
masses is a force that should not be underestimated. 
 
2.4  Conclusion: Will Democratization Prevail? 
According to Anderson (2011) and Gause (2011), scholars should readapt their 
theories to catch up with developments in the Middle East. At the same time, the West 
and especially the US should adjust their agendas to best relate with the Arab 
circumstances. While exported democratization agendas and external wars proved a 
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failure in the ME, change according to Tarabusli (2011) came from within due to the 
strength of demography and popular politics.  
Geopolitically, the Middle East region is in turmoil, where regional powers are 
trying to catch up as much as they can for future probable gains. Turkey, Qatar, and 
Saudi Arabia, backed by the US are singing on the same pitch. Syria according to 
Taraboulsi (2011) escaped its Mumana’a role. This puts in question the future of the 
region, especially the stratification between the politically opposing countries would be 
clearer when the Arab Spring crystallizes. Some claim that this is the aggrandizement 
project of the Middle East where the liberal political Islam like the Turkish model is 
most welcomed by the US, but yet in Egypt it hasn’t been the case.  
Until now, democratization is still not reached in the region. Tunisia is grappling 
with class and ideological division. Egypt must redesign the political and governmental 
institutions. And for sure Libya needs to recover from the civil war, whereas the bloody 
war in Syria must stop. Despite all that, the people of the region turned the last page of 
authoritarianism as it was perceived couple of years ago, and the wall of fear has 
collapsed. Since revolutions are still fire under the sand, it is worth noting at the end 
that democratization is in itself a revolution. In the next two chapters, the economic 
policies adopted in the liberalization period are going to be revisited. Taking the cases 
of Tunisia and Egypt as case studies, this this will examine the social effects of a 
Macro-economic policy choice and its underlying relationship with political turmoil. 
Zooming into social and economic indicators will unpack the untold story about the 
economic prerequisites of the Arab Uprising.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE LABORATORY OF ECONOMIC FAILURE: 
TUNISIA AND EGYPT, THE ROOT TO 
EXPLOSION 
3.1  Introduction: History Told Us     
Four years after the Arab Spring, and eight years since the global financial 
crisis, the current world economic order is shaking. The Arab region, as part of the 
developing world, has always been a consumer of products originating from the most 
advanced economic countries and politically rotates in the orbit of international powers 
and agencies (Amin, 2011). A review of the modern history of the region tells that 
failure to achieve economic development has trickled down to negative consequences 
on social structures and class mobility. Neoliberal economics as a model adopted in 
most of the countries in the region, correlates political liberalization with economic 
advancement and development. Originated in the West between the 1950s and 1960s, it 
argues that “democracy develops slowly in response to particular socio-economic 
preconditions”, where “material interest translates into political outcomes, with 
economic decentralization pushing political decentralization” (Brynen, Moore, 
Salloukh, & Zahar, 2012, p. 214). In other terms, democracy is a function of the 
dynamics between empowering political oppositions and tactical political shifts using 
specific democratic values and slogans.  
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The dynamic of political change is based on a set of economic changes as well, 
such as industrialization, urbanization, increased personal income, and social changes 
(Brynen et al., 2012). Industrialization and urbanization represent the heavy component 
in the transformation process serving as infrastructures to accommodate a change in the 
lighter ones. The light component of change invests in social dynamics through meeting 
the interests of a strong middle class, given its economic importance of being the social 
segment that saves and consumes at the same time. Investing in middle class interests is 
seen as political safeguards and legitimacy sources. In fact, this dynamic had a more 
deteriorating effect, where the middle classes demolished, privatization benefiting the 
few, and political participation streaked. The Arab Spring as an event, and after decades 
of deprivation, has mobilized youth and middle class, who happened to be the most 
affected social structures, to shake the status quo of the region: despite revolutions may 
result in political instability, failed states, and socio-economic crises, aspirations 
towards democratic transition are worth taking the risk (Al-Momani, 2011)    
Economic and political liberalization are tools authoritarian regimes may resort 
to in periods of economic and political crises to upgrade / maintain ruling systems. In 
most of the cases in the Arab World, economic liberalization did not lead to 
democratization as neo-liberal scholars argue. The economic development paradigm 
adopted neutralized any bottom up change, by coopting the middle class, oppressing 
civil participation, with CSO’s becoming de-facto political opposition groups, or agents 
for regimes, and monopolizing the private sector, whereby private business follows 
regime interests in most of the cases (Langohr, 2004). The social dynamics of economic 
development become static, the economy grows by nominal values, and political 
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participation is choked or substituted by inefficient supply of public goods by the state 
(Malik & Awadallah, 2011; Campante & Chor, 2012). This chapter will explore further 
the historical pattern of economic modeling in Tunisia and Egypt, the adoption of the 
neoliberal model, and the underlying effects on social structures that generated the 
uprising overtime. 
 
3.2  Tunisia: The Spark of the Arab Spring 
Mouhamed Bouazizi, an educated street vendor set himself on fire on 17 
December 2011 sparkling a wave of protests in Tunisia. The wounds of the young man 
ignited thousands of Tunisians across the country, occupying the streets and public 
spaces, and resulting a collapse of an autocratic regime. Bouazizi was an example of 
hundreds of thousands of skilled, educated, and unemployed workers suffering from 
unequal social and economic opportunities dictated by the authoritarian political 
system.  
Surf across the modern history of Tunisia portrays more than four decades of 
rising socio-economic inequalities shaped by the political fluctuation of the country 
between different external actors under different political rulings and governance 
models. Since independence in 1956 and until 2011, Tunisia had two presidents: Habib 
Bourguiba, elected in 1957, who is the founder and leader of the anticolonial Neo-
Destour party. The country’s foreign policy during his rule was directed towards the 
West. This rule started with secular modernization and social development, and 
widened access to education and social reforms, under a state led economic 
development model (Brynen et al., 2012). 
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Few years down the line, the ‘Parti Socialiste Destourien’ (PSD) became the 
sole corporatist mechanism for mobilizing social support for the regime. In 1987, Zine 
el-Abidine Ben Ali, is prime minister of Bourguiba and former military officer led a 
soft coup. The new president came at a time of labor unrest coupled with increased 
Islamist opposition. He reformed the PSD into the Rassemblement Constitutionel 
Democratique (RCD), giving an impression of political openness. Yet, the opposite was 
true. Ben Ali strengthened the security apparatus of the state, coopted other groups, 
mainly the major trade union (Tunisian General Labor Union), and clamped down 
against the moderate Islamist party Al-Nahda. Throughout his rule, Ben Ali always won 
the parliamentary elections with a 99% rate, a general trend in the authoritarian politics 
and regime systems across the Arab region.  
Ben Ali’s regime adopted liberal economic policies, where the country achieved 
an aggregate GDP growth of 5% per year, between 1990s and 2000s. The economic 
performance was mainly based on the nonproductive sectors, trade and tourism, a main 
feature of neoliberal economic models. During this period, social indicators improved, 
yet inequalities and income disparities raised sharply. The economic policy of the 
country facilitated the spread of crony capitalism, where economic growth benefited the 
inner circle of the regime (Brynen et al., 2012). The Arab spring proved that economic 
growth alone is not enough; grass root level benefits are good determinant of wellbeing 
and representative indicators of sound policies. In Egypt, the second country of the 
Arab Spring, the historical trend did not differ much.   
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3.3 Egypt: The Clinically Dead Economy 
Egypt, one of most geopolitically and strategically positioned countries in the 
region, followed Tunisia in the quest for freedom and change. What was hidden 
somehow in Tunisia, in terms of oppression and inequalities, was too obvious in Egypt. 
One quarter of the country’s population, around 20 out of 82.5 million, live under the 
global poverty line (World Bank , 2014). After all, the modern history of the country 
with exception of the Nassersit era, has economically favored the few at the expense of 
the rest. The adoption of the Washington Consensus during the liberalization period has, 
like Tunisia, institutionalized crony capitalism, shaping much of the negative public 
opinion towards the ruling (Heydarian, 2011) elite. In Egypt, cronyism and inequality 
determine the major variable of popular uprising, portrayed by forty years of economic, 
social, and political favoritism, emerging a rich bourgeoisie, the single recipient of the 
benefits of a globalized liberal model (Amin, 2011: An Arab springtime?, 2011).        
In the post British era, Egypt emerged as a constitutional monarchy and stayed 
so until 1952, when a coup, known as the ‘Free Officers’ coup, led by Gemal Abdel 
Nasser overthrew King Farouq’s monarchy. The revolutionary officers came to power 
with nationalistic ideologies condemning the corruption and inequality of the old order. 
Nevertheless, they banned other parties and suppressed political opposition. Between 
the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt played the role of a regional champion of Arab nationalism, 
bringing the common interests of the Arab people into the forefronts of politics. From 
inside, a single political party known as Arab Socialist Party (ASU) emerged to 
maintain domestic support (Brynen et al., 2012; Amin, 2011). 
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The turning in the Pan Arabism era came with the death of Nasser in 1970 and 
the accession of Anwar Al Sadat, one of the ‘Free Officers’, to power. The foreign 
policy of Egypt during Sadat’s rule was completely different from his precedent. A 
peace deal with Israel was been signed in 1979, reorienting local and international 
politics towards the United States. During this period, more economic liberalization 
processes was launched. Furthermore the ASU was broken, and a limited multi-party 
system emerged. The new actor in the local political scene was the National Democratic 
Party (NDP), reshaping the order as the dominant pro-regime political force under the 
patronage of the regime. Sadat’s assassination in 1981 brought Hosni Mubarak to 
power, who also maintained close ties with the US. Mubarak pursued further economic 
reform and privatization, paving for the emergence of a well-established crony capitalist 
model. The multi-party system continued with the dominance of the NDP (Brynen et 
al,. 2012; Amin, 2011).  
Economic grievances dominated Mubarak’s rule in a similar manner as his Ben 
Ali’s Tunisia. GDP growth fluctuated in Egypt under Mubarak: in the past 15 years, the 
GDP fluctuated between 3.5%, 7.2% as a peak in 2008, and 2.1 % by the end of 2013 
(World Bank, 2014). Unemployment is still widespread in Egypt especially among 
youth and educated people. The local economy is highly informal as the cost of doing 
business in Egypt is considerably high for locals. The global increase in food prices 
affected severely the country especially in 2010 and 2011. Across different periods, the 
ruling elite have been the sole winner capturing most of economic rents. Since 2011, in 
both Egypt and Tunisia, local economies have been affected by turbulent regional 
political scene, weak global economy, negatively affecting local business and 
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investments, coupled by increased popular demands of better life and working 
conditions  (Heydarian, 2011; Brynen et al., 2012). In Egypt, the Arab Spring can pave 
the way towards a mixed economy that can reintegrate deprived populations, meet 
youth aspirations, and transform social structures if given the opportunity (Amin, 2011: 
An Arab springtime?, 2011).    
 
3.4  The Neoliberal Prototype: Bad Seed at the Wrong Time and Place 
3.4.1 The Political Economy of Rent: State’s Original Sin 
The political economy of the Arab region has five common aspects that allow 
drawing of a conceptual framework on the political economy of the adopted model: (1) 
concentration of political and economic power in the hands of few, (2) most of the 
states fall under the “security state” concept where the coercive apparatus of the state is 
fierce and extensive, (3) a dynamic demographic structure with high youth segments, 
(4) centralized governance structures, dominant public sector and weak private 
enterprises, and finally (5) huge reliance on external revenues (oil, aid or remittances) 
(Malik & Awadallah, 2011). 
Arab Spring countries, especially Tunisia and Egypt, are highly representative of 
the above mentioned factors. Crony capitalism and inner circles control the wealth of 
the countries, dominate private sector institutions, and benefit from the security 
apparatus. Social mobility is always neutralized by a central governance model, and 
contained by security forces blocking political participation. Lastly, the economies of 
Tunisia and Egypt were harshly affected by the global financial crisis when Tunisian 
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trade and tourism remittances sharply decreased, and foreign aid to Egypt largely 
shrunk (ANND & Christian Aid, 2009).    
The original and structural fault in the Arab world prior to explosion in 2011 and 
over decades of dictatorships was the role played by the state. State-lead development 
models have put the state as the most important economic actor covering all productive 
sectors. At the same time, the state has been the sole provider of basic assistance to its 
citizens in terms of food, shelter, jobs, and energy sources. The control over market 
functions and heavy usage of subsidies has also created inefficiencies and price 
distortions. States in the Arab region have also failed to provide justice to their citizens, 
leading to increased clientalism, corruption, and cronyism (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). 
In sum, “Reliance on unearned income streams is the original sin of Arab economies” 
(Malik & Awadallah, 2011, p. 5).  
As Tunisia and Egypt share the most common prerequisites of crony capitalism, 
and being the first two countries of the Arab Spring, both regimes represented a living 
experimental laboratory of neoliberalism in the region. A socioeconomic profiling of 
their general patterns allows theorizing about the features of rentier economies tied with 
international economic policy dictators cross the globe. More specifically, Tunisia and 
Egypt are examples of non-oil economies with aid determined structures where rent has 
been always derived. Aid revenues in both countries choked economic and political 
incentives, turning economies from aid to patronage. Egypt for instance has witnessed 
throughout its modern history a ‘resource curse’, where two thirds of foreign exchange 
revenues were derived from aid and Suez Canal revenues (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). 
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In other words, two thirds of Egypt’s external revenue was a function of 
international markets fluctuations, thus increasing the vulnerability of the local 
economy to external economic shocks (Amin, 2011). Furthermore, what goes for Egypt 
can be also applied to Tunisia where remittances from trade and tourism slowed down 
sharply in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The Middle East and North Africa 
region in general has had a long history with aid as well. This region “received the 
highest overseas development assistance in 2008 - $73 per capita compared to $49 in 
sub-Saharan Africa – north Africa has been the biggest recipient of net aid per capita 
since the 1960s” (Malik & Awadallah, 2011, p. 5). In most of the cases, this aid was 
driven by geo-political considerations (Heydarian, 2011). The net result of pegging 
local economies to aid and remittances in Tunisia and Egypt can be portrayed as 
follows:  “Resource windfalls from oil and aid have given rise to an adverse political 
economy and sustained a social pact that trades welfare distribution for regime security. 
External rents have expanded the public sector, bolstering its ability to provide 
employment and subsidized public consumption” (Malik & Awadallah, 2011, p. 5), but 
in a clientelist manner.  
 
3.4.2 The Markets and Reverse Effect: What Went Wrong?  
According to neoliberal economics, free markets make free politics (Brynen et 
al., 2012). The concept went with policy making in the developed world. Yet in the 
cases of the developing countries, free markets did not make free politics. More 
specifically, in the Middle East, this concept paved the way for authoritarian regime 
persistence and upgrading over the past four decades (Gause III, 2011). Regimes tied 
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their foreign policies towards international economic and political actors who facilitated 
the institutionalization of neoliberalism through specific sets of policies and recipes. 
According to neoliberals: “greater political participation flows from curtailment of 
market forces rather than from abdication to unfettered market rule”, where in fact, the 
“global spread of markets forces would lead not to greater political participation but 
rather to exclusion and inequality” (Brynen et al., 2012, p. 213) 
The trend of economic liberalization in the Arab world emerged in the 1970s. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) orchestered socio 
economic policies and models through reform agendas and structural adjustment loans. 
Liberalization of certain sectors achieved some quantitative GDP growth, yet, the Arab 
Spring has posed serious questions on the quality of that growth and its impact on the 
livelihoods of citizens. Economic growth in most of the cases did not lead to economic 
development. Intermittent waves of protests in Egypt, Tunisia, or anywhere else, 
accused governments of creating lump-sided economy: “Long held public expectations 
for higher living standards failed and this fed the protests” (Brynen, et al., 2012, p. 214).  
The economic prerequisite of the Arab Spring is believed to be associated with a 
static development model all over the region, leading to long term economic failure. 
More importantly, this model has been financed through exogenous sources, based on 
inefficient forms of intervention and redistribution (Anderson, 2011). Authoritarian 
persistence and upgrading came with a monetary cost (Moore & Salloukh, 2007). 
Across decades of dictatorships, regimes in Tunisia and Egypt faced a rising cost of 
repression and redistribution, which put at the end of the day the sustainability of the 
pursued model at risk of bankruptcy and collapse (Malik & Awadallah, 2011).  
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Some political economists argued that in Tunisia and Egypt the adopted 
development models could not develop independent and competitive private sectors 
facilitating a smooth and well established integration into global markets (Malik & 
Awadallah, 2011). This argument is based on the following political and regional 
challenge: first, markets were unable to produce income independent from state 
produced rent, raising threats based on different local political consideration. Second, 
the establishment of a correct private sector facilitating regional and global markets 
integration has been a function of fragmented economic units spread and isolated 
geographically along the Arab region (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). Hence an impossible 
integration into global markets through the catalyst of private sector has jeopardized the 
main factor of the neoliberal model. Markets did not work locally, were isolated 
regionally, and far positioned from any global effective exchange and interaction.    
State led development paradigms in Tunisia and Egypt were highly penetrated 
by external actors prohibiting the production of sovereign national income generating 
sectors, such as the private sector. External development assistance programs in Tunisia 
and Egypt – tied by political conditionality, institutionalized informal economic 
activities by granting the political and administrative ownership of projects to specific 
actors; these projects were facilitating a specific political culture upgrading economic 
violence and social deprivation (Amin, 2012). Further, this has been usually associated 
with a stagnant business environment overarched by a limiting legal framework for the 
benefit of regimes inner circles. Public finance policies reached a limitation ceiling, 
where taxation policies, redistribution of income, and hence political representation 
became static (Cordesman, 2011). Reliance on exogenous factors such as foreign aid, 
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conditional trade, and vulnerable services sectors decreased state sovereignty over 
sources of income, and hence closed the way in front of creating local income 
generating alternatives and substitutes (ANND & Christian Aid, 2009; Cordesman, 
2011). This dynamic exists whenever issues related to food security in Egypt and 
sovereign debt in Tunisia for example. The overall result is a status of diseconomies of 
scale where additional costs will cause spiking of prices, distortion of markets 
distortions and debt trapped public finances (Malik & Awadallah, 2011).  
 
3.4.3 Economic to Political Liberalization: Moving Against the Wind  
Whenever the Arab region is analyzed, it cannot be taken as one “Arab World” 
as the language may tell. It is in fact a wide geographical area, with approximately 
interrelated territories, defined borders, but tied or unified economically and socially. 
This region is about a number of states encompassing disparities in economics, political 
systems, and endowment in natural resources (Brynen et al., p. 217). Yet similarities 
exist in terms of economic policy formulation and integration into the global capitalist 
economy (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). The Arab region has all the criteria of unity and 
complementarity but missed the most important one: the political will and orientation 
(Malik & Awadallah, 2011). As politics dictated the economic policy in the Arab 
region, development paradigms should be traced across the different stages of economic 
development towards political liberalization. More importantly, Arab Spring countries, 
mainly Tunisia and Egypt have the roots of their revolutions in 2011 embedded in more 
than three decades of failed economic policies. 
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The phases of economic development and liberalization prior to revolutions in 
2011 are three: (1) the early statist phase, (2) the economic opening, and (3) structural 
adjustments or neoliberal phase (Brynen et al., 2012). The first phase is the post-
independence period where politics actually dictated economic policy making under an 
inherited centralized system. The argument back then indicated that “successful 
economic development required strong state leadership to kick start advancement” 
(Brynen et al., 2012, p. 217). Somehow similar to ‘Rostow’s Stages of Development’, 
this economic policy in this period focused on: the growth of the public sector, 
nationalization of private firms, pricing and trade controls, and rural land reform. 
Economic policy components meant to pave the way towards a state-led development 
process. To maintain the upper hand in the implementation of the development agenda, 
economic policies were used to muster political legitimacy. A cliental rentier economy 
during this phase succeeded in achieving some nominal increase in the GDP, yet 
economic development was unattainable. As immediate results of growth, the expansion 
of public services was natural, where some job opportunities have been created, better 
urban infrastructure, as well as increased social services such as education and health 
(Amin 2011; Brynen et al.,2012). 
The economic opening era, the second phase, also known as Infitah, economic 
liberalization was sought by many Arab countries including Tunisia and Egypt, as a 
response to increased public debt and decreased growth rate in the aftermath of the 
1970s oil crisis. The local economies were left in this era to internal and international 
market dynamics where the private sector has expanded, public sector reformed, 
coupled with loose legal frameworks. In Tunisia “a 1972 law provided incentives for 
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firms to export to international markets”, followed by Egypt where “series of laws were 
introduced beginning in 1974 that made it easier for foreign investors to establish joint 
ventures with local enterprises” (Brynen et al., 2012, p. 218). Imported economic 
liberalization programs have been implemented to align national economic policy 
making with an international trend based on specific standards. Localization integration 
strategies were put in place to ensure economic gains are driven political calculations. 
The involvement of international lending agencies in the domestic affairs of Tunisia and 
Egypt started heavily after almost a decade of the implementation kick off. Of course, 
the private sector was used as a driving force for economic openness, yet the rent was 
redirected towards the political supporters of regimes. Whenever the economy produced 
negative crowding out or fell into liquidity trap, austerity measures have been put in 
place to readjust monetary and fiscal figures. Such measures led to by labor strikes in 
Tunisia and Egypt (1977), but the latter were oppressed by security forces (Amin, 2011; 
Brynen et al., 2012).  Consequently, “Egypt’s impressive growth in the latter half of the 
1970s owed more to increasing commodity prices and domestic consumption than to the 
country’s reform policies. Likewise, while old-guard capitalists enjoyed greater 
participation in the policymaking process, broader political inclusion or decentralization 
did not take place” – hence liberalization without democratization (Brynen et al., 2012, 
p. 219). 
The third phase, known as the structural adjustment or neoliberal phase is 
nothing but the institutionalization of the economic model adopted with one major 
consequence: political liberalization without democratization (Amin, 2011; Brynen et 
al., 2012). During the 1980s the Arab region witnessed an economic shock: decline in 
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oil prices has decreased bilateral aid and labor remittances leading to a one to one 
decrease in GDP growth. Arab countries, mainly Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan entered into 
severe economic crises, where governments resorted to austerity measures, giving rise to 
public oppositions once again (Amin, 2011; Brynen et al, 2012). At that time, a change 
in the international political arena has been witnessed due to the rising financial power 
of the United States. The emergence of the new player’s political role revived classical 
liberal thought, paving the way towards a new economic order. “Past commitments to 
state led economic growth was replaced with core neoliberal emphases on liberalization, 
privatization, and deregulation” (Brynen et al., 2012, p. 220), leaving the World Bank 
and the International Monetary fund at the lead to institutionalize this change.  
Reshaping domestic governance and economic models began in Tunisia and 
Egypt through what was called structural adjustments programs. “In return for loan 
assistance, countries would have to enter into agreements termed structural adjustment 
programs, requiring policies that on paper at least went far beyond infitah efforts” 
(Brynen et al., 2012, p. 220). 
Since that time, economic development models in the Arab region (non-oil 
producing countries), especially Tunisia and Egypt, were based on growth-led policies 
orchestrated by the recommendations of the Washington consensus. The main pillars of 
these models focused on removing distortions, reliance on market mechanisms, removal 
of subsidies and price control, reduction of public sector and trade barriers, and 
devaluation of currencies (Amin, 2011). This development ideology was seen as a 
stabilization policy for local economies as well as a window for international and local 
political gains (Heydarian, 2011). As a result economic development was not achieved 
48 
 
as the quality of the growth achieved was not sustainable. The quality of growth 
promised by neo-liberalism did not materialize: “After decades of various neoliberal 
reforms, little developmental progress has been made in the Middle East” (Brynen et al., 
2012, p. 222). Economic reform was stagnant enough to neutralize political mobility 
(ILO & UNDP, 2012). Three decades down the line, the whole region has been put at 
the edge of social and political breakdown (Heydarian, 2011).  
 
3.5  The Social Dimension: Demography, Class Structures, and 
Markets 
 
3.5.1 Economic Policy Making: The Root of Social Hardship   
Fueled by economic and social injustice demands, the popular uprisings in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and the rest of the Arab states in 2011 introduced uncertainty in the 
Arab region ( O’Sullivian, Rey, & Mendez, 2011; Kuhn, 2012). High unemployment 
rates, especially among educated youth, pushed social movements to place job creation 
as a top priority for economic policy making and development agendas (ESCWA, 2012; 
ILO & UNDP, 2012). Until 2011, Tunisia and Egypt were considered as economic 
miracles of the neo-liberal economic models (Heydarian, 2011). Yet, economic policies 
were the main hidden pillar and determinant of the popular uprisings. However, when it 
comes to social dynamics, economic policy making in both countries as well as in non-
oil producing countries in the Arab region, have been explicit and harsh on social 
structures. Job creation and employment policies are important variables to look at to 
trace economic injustice and inequality. The effects of uneven redistribution overarched 
with crony capitalism leading to social degradation at the societal (rich and poor) and 
gender (males and females):  
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“Unemployment rates in the Middle East are among the highest in the 
world, and the average unemployment rate is estimated to have increased 
from 9.9 percent in 2010 to 10.2 in 2011, with male unemployment 
estimated at 8.3 percent and female unemployment at 18.7 per cent” 
(Ryder, 2013).  
 
Intermittent economic growth cycles in Tunisia and Egypt affected 
unemployment severely (Amin, 2011). The Cyclical redundancy was seen as natural, 
yet poverty rates have been always increasing due to a structural cause in the economic 
system and model adopted where inequality and income disparity increased. One in five 
people in the Arab region lived on $1 to $2 a day between 1987 and 2001, and one in 
ten was unemployed as of 2000s; furthermore, whenever these figures are overlaid with 
population growth, the trend indicates that the number of people living under extreme 
poverty was increasing (ANND & Christian Aid, 2009). Economic models adopted in 
Tunisia and Egypt increased the vulnerability of their local economies to external 
shocks. The global financial crises hit the main revenue sources in both countries as of 
2007 (ANND & Christian Aid, 2009). The general remittances trend of the MENA 
region indicates around 6.2 percent downturn from 2008 to 2009 (7.6% to 1.4 %), with 
a monetary value ranging from USD 31 to USD 36 billion (ANND & Christian Aid, 
2009). Aid also has been considered as a main but volatile source of revenue of GDP 
and budgets for some countries in the Arab region. In the after math of the global crisis, 
aid volume significantly decreased. Tunisia received 3.2 percent of its GDP during the 
1990s and 1.3 percent in 2008 whereas the Egyptian government budgets suffered from 
a cut from 12.6% to around 1 percent in 2008 (ANND & Christian Aid, 2009).       
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3.5.2 Markets and Social Classes: Falling in the Cracks  
In theory, neoliberal economists claim that the increased income of the middle 
class will allow them to push for more political changes in pursuit of benefits leading to 
democratization in the longer run (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). Hence, the middle class 
is seen as a safety valve and a change factor at the same time. The middle class, when it 
has access to information, becomes socio-politically active; and hence, the middle class 
is to provoke the central state by requesting public services and political participation 
(Brynen et al., 2012). Along the middle class, civil society, or the organized group of 
professional from different backgrounds and sectors should mobilize social forces 
towards political change. The liberalization process entailed emergence of such groups 
in the Arab region, notably Egypt and Tunisia, yet their effect was neutralized. 
Economic powers selected social groups as allies leaving the vast majority falling into 
poverty and misery (Hydemann, 2010). 
Social structures in uprising states in the Arab region share a common feature: 
corrupt elites. Historically, and notably during the liberalization period, non - 
democratic political coalitions built on state patronage emerged from economic reforms: 
labor and businesses became de-facto agents for the state (Brynen et al., 2012). During 
periods of economic crises, regimes used to resort to these groups to secure legitimacy. 
Over time, regimes knew how to navigate through these types of crises.  
“While economic reform in theory seeks to reduce webs of patronage 
and monopoly rents that ostensibly weigh on economic development and 
make authoritarian rule harder, the reality has been quite different. In 
fact political patronage networks have been characterized by redesign, 
adaptation, and selective capturing in the wake of most economic 
reform” (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh, & Zahar, 2012, p. 226).  
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Instead of working for the poor during periods of recovery, transition or crises, markets 
have functioned for the benefit of these inner circles and business patronage networks. 
State-led development failed to stimulate local economic growth because on consequent 
economic meltdowns (Amin, 2011; ILO & UNDP, 2012). Hence, the private sector, 
which connects to a set of market dynamics, should be able to fill the vacuum. The 
example of the private sector in the Arab region, notably in Egypt and Tunisia failed 
however to do that: “A singular failure of the Arab world is that it has been 
unsuccessful in developing a strong private sector that is connected with global markets, 
survives without state crutches and generates productive employment for it young” 
(Malik & Awadallah, 2011, p. 3). The private sector in the Arab world had an imbedded 
structure prohibiting it from generating and favoring income at the micro or household 
level.  
“The private sector in the Arab world is a capitalistic group outside the 
control of the state in the pragmatic sense, acting as an interest group in 
social dynamics of democratization, yet it can never be seen as a change 
agent because of its inability of holding the state accountable for 
extracting resources and organizing business, revenue allocation and 
public spending sector” (Brynen et al., 2012, p. 215).  
 
Lastly, private sector challenges and its role with social structures and income 
generation opportunities is usually seen from a narrow technocratic and apolitical lens. 
Yet, the Middle East experience was molded by international lending institutions 
instructions and recipes, notably the World Bank. The role of the international player 
has been evident in the Arab countries throughout years (Heydarian, 2011).  
“Private sector development is not simply a matter of improving 
investment climate, reducing the cost of doing business, offering cheap 
credit, or introducing market friendly economic reforms. It is also a 
political problem, since a private sector can create income streams 
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independent of the patronage network of the regime, thereby challenging 
the ruler’s position” (Malik & Awadallah, 2011, p. 4). 
 
Future governments should engage in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) to exit a period 
of false economic doctrine. Public Private Partnership is a gateway for social and 
economic development whenever it is liberalized from corruption and clientlism. It is 
seen as a good practice especially as it creates jobs and empowers social structures 
especially youth and middle classes (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014).  
 
3.5.3 Demographics: Youth, Education, and The Snow Ball Effect 
Although the middle class in revolting Arab societies enjoyed little socio-
economic benefits, it can be said that access to education increased over the past 
decades. Educated youth in Tunisia and Egypt started to represent a hidden ticking 
bomb for regimes the moment they started getting involved in public politics. Through 
skills upgrading, and continuous informal mobility, coupled with increased security 
apparatus by the state, the hate-hate relationship started to grow (Brynen et al., 2012; 
Campante & Chor, 2012; (Kuhn, 2012).  
“Starting from one of the lowest levels of educational achievement in the 
1960’s, adult education rose faster in the Middle East during the 1980-
2000 period than any other region in the world – despite reservations 
about the quality of education imparted, even this quantitative expansion 
of education has led to a silent revolution of sorts. It is a revolution of 
aspirations. Even as aspirations have become more mobile with the new 
gadgets of globalization, the local systems of governance are ossified 
and offer limited economic mobility to the region’s youth. Even physical 
mobility across borders is restricted. Unlike Western Europe, where class 
based struggles have historically driven political change; the Middle East 
is witnessing a truly generational struggle for inclusion” (Malik & 
Awadallah, 2011, p. 3). 
 
Other factors as rising inequality, poor and weak social associations, large 
informal sector, and limited access to jobs, the social dimension of the popular uprising 
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has been boiling especially Tunisia and Egypt, yet with a low profile. “Failed economic 
liberalization in the ME is not one of continuity or lack of change. Rather, the same 
factors and dynamics that were blocking liberalization of economic resources were also 
likely contributing to popular decline in regime support” (Brynen et al., 2012, p. 227). 
In short, Arab popular uprisings sprung from poverty, unemployment, and deficiency of 
economic opportunities (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). Furthermore, the population 
growth, increase in youth ratio, access to education, and overall demographic profile of 
the region have hit a wall of socio-economic injustice. Economic structures of 
development models adopted did not match the highly increasing demographic needs. 
Educated labor forces in the region fell into the cracks of inefficient markets, stagnant 
employment policies, lack of social protection, and absence of political participation 
(Campante & Chor, 2012). This has led to tremendous economic injustice for the young 
who see little hope for economic and social mobility. 
 
3.5.4 Food Security, Labor Force and Aspirations 
A growing demography with a wide youth base in the Arab Region has 
exhausted welfare systems. Further, economic shocks resulting from different global 
phenomena such as increases in prices, crises, and political instability infiltrating 
vulnerable economies of Tunisia and Egypt has put additional pressures on weak state 
structures and systems. Increase in food prices for instance stretched the systems all 
over, even with resource endowed regions. The MENA region has the largest food 
deficit in the world where it depends massively on food imports widening by far the 
base of debt and economic dependence.  As food prices continue to spike food subsidies 
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become an unsustainable fiscal policies tool for most of the developing countries. Food 
security in the Arab region became one of the hottest topics since 2007. For instance, 
food subsidies on wheat consumed US$3 billion in 2011 out of the total government 
budget (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). 
 
3.5.5 Human Development and Sustainable Development  
Tunisia and Egypt, taken as Arab Spring country cases did not achieve 
economic development over time (Amin, 2011). Moreover, and despite improvements 
reflected Human Development Indexes, policies did not advance a comprehensive 
vision to link human development with sustainable development as the theory suggests 
(Sen, 1999). Although Tunisia and Egypt’s youth had access to subsidized education, 
both countries did not achieve to accommodate university graduates in labor markets 
(Kuhn, 2012). In other words, human development, sustainable development, and 
democratic transition were delinked in the Arab Region. The Arab Spring hence 
represents a good opportunity to capitalize on existing improvements and human 
resources to transit into sustainable development and later on democracies:    
“As the bond between citizen and state frayed, a new generation of 
political protest movement emerged, facilitated by the rise of information 
technologies. In addition to material grievances, the wave of protests 
reflected a collective sense, emerging throughout the Arab world, that 
citizens could expect more from their governments, including a right to 
self-determination”  (Kuhn, 2012, p. 674).  
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Hence, human development should shape the path of the Arab Spring’s way forward as 
a work in progress by linking the stratified sculptures of society through productive 
economies creating social safety nets (Malik & Awadallah, 2011; Kuhn, 2012; ANND, 
ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014).  
 
3.6  Conclusion: the Way Forward and Lessons Learned     
The Arab Spring highlights the need for a new development paradigm (ANND, 
ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014). At its heart, an educational reform linked with 
employment strategies should be done. Fortifying productive sectors towards more 
oriented labor intensive job creation to decrease unemployment, poverty should be the 
pillars of the next development plan of both countries (ILO & UNDP, 2012). Industry 
should have heavy weight in development strategies since the region holds less than 1 
% of the world’s non fuel exports compared to 10 % in Esat Asian and 4% in Latin 
America; there must be a shift from natural resources towards more global and 
competitive industrial sector (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). Post crises reform plans 
should address a shift towards a new social contract equipped with nontraditional 
subsidies and more competitive entrepreneurship productive and private sectors (Malik 
& Awadallah, 2011).  
Ambitious planning and aspirations towards more comprehensive development 
should tackle transformative governance models to decrease clientalism and informality 
in the economy. Yet, “revolutionary upheavals can often lead more quickly to de jure 
change in political institutions, without necessarily altering the underlying distribution 
of economic power” (Malik & Awadallah, 2011, p. 2). In this sense, Greater political 
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representation should be coupled with greater access to economic opportunities. Reform 
agendas should revisit the centrality of the state in development agendas and be always 
proactive with demographic growth. Youth represent ¾ of the total population in the 
Arab world, where an increase in the participation of women in labor markets has 
increased the volume of job seekers representing additional burdens. “During the period 
of 1996 – 2006 labor forces in the Middle East and north Africa has grown three times 
as much annually as the rest of the developing world resulting in one of the largest rates 
of youth unemployment in the world” (Malik & Awadallah, 2011, p. 2). The next 
chapter will sketch the new development paradigm, while identifying existing linkages 
with the international neo-liberal system, and its limitations to development in light of 
the Global Financial Crisis and the Arab Spring.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LIMITS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NEOLIBERAL SYSTEM: 
THE NEED FOR A NEW DEVELOPMENT 
PARADIGM  
 
4.1  Introduction: Development as Freedom      
Amartya Kumar Sen in his book ‘Development as Freedom’ (1999) traces the 
aspects of human, social, and economic development as a way out of poverty towards 
freedom. Sketching the roots of the current international capitalist system can indicate 
that peoples’ livelihoods in the Third World are subject to a type of informal slavery 
expressed in poverty, social deprivation, political tyranny and cultural authoritarianism 
(Sen, 1999). Hence, development is considered as the vehicle that liberates people from 
their actual misery; social institutions or different stakeholders in an economy bear the 
responsibility for freeing citizens with respect to their human dignity. Moreover issues 
of values and norms are highly correlated with institutions and development processes. 
Hence, the social basis of individual wellbeing and freedom are addressed in terms of 
economic policies and practices (Sen, 1999). The current international system, mainly 
evolving in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rising powers of 
global capitalistic entities (states and institutions) favored the few at the expense of 
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others. Yet, global crises are increasing at a faster rate as the world’s economic 
problems deepen and the largest burden is held by developing countries (Woods, 2013). 
Recently, the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 uncovered the deficiencies in the 
global economic model. It demystified liberal economic policies and facilitated the 
emergence of political crises (Heydarian, 2011). The increasing unemployment rates 
threatened governments and regimes not only in the developing countries but also in the 
most developed economies (Woods, 2013). Standardization politics, where one model 
could fit everywhere has been proven to be faulty in light of the global developments. 
Wars, climate change, forced migration, and other man made hazards are only outputs 
of that unequal model (Woods, 2013). This chapter will explore the links between the 
international financial crises and the development model adopted in Tunisia and Egypt; 
identify the economic component of the uprisings at global, regional, and local levels, 
and lastly tracing the features of a new development paradigm.   
 
4.2  Trickle Down Economics and Politics 
The neo-liberal model reached its limit. Whenever overwhelmed, it exploded 
damaging those who did not create it: 
“The Crisis of the euro shows that the bourgeoisie has no idea how to 
solve the problems of Greece, Spain and Italy which in turn threaten the 
future of the European Common currency and even the EU itself. This 
can easily be the catalyst for a new collapse on a world scale, which will 
be even deeper than the crisis of 2008” (Woods, 2013, p. 1) 
 
The recent Global Financial Crises portrayed how macro level crises in the most 
developed economies of the world can trickle down to the smallest household in a rural 
area in Tunisia or Egypt. Hence, there is something to explore here about the timing of 
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the Arab Spring and international and regional interconnectedness (Greene & Kuswa, 
2012). The eruption of the Global Financial Crises hit developing economies of the 
region, notably Tunisia and Egypt, the countries with ‘parasite’ vulnerable economies, 
and heavily reliant on external income (Woods, 2013; ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 
2014). The Global Financial Crises broke the most vulnerable neoliberal prototypes in 
the region that were considered economic miracles (Heydarian, 2011). The current 
capitalistic model and recent experiences would further reproduce the same modalities 
and lead to similar results unless a more “hybrid” system is put in place (Amin, 2011). 
Afterall, “Capitalism contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction that it is an 
anarchic and chaotic system characterized by periodic crises that throw people out of 
work and cause social and political stability” (Woods, 2013, p. 2).   
 
4.2.1 Revolutions: Economic Performance and Time  
Revolutions are not outcomes in advanced countries, they occur in places 
witnessing long years of exceptional economic growth without any political reform or 
in countries hit by an economic shock after a period of prosperity (Heydarian, 2011). In 
other words, people don’t “take a step forward unless it is obliged to do so under the 
pressure of extreme necessity” (Woods, 2013, p. 12). This is when the masses decide to 
take out their support to a certain regime after having high expectations and relative 
deprivation (Heydarian, 2011, p. 2). Hence revolution is a work in progress and a result 
of accumulations: 
“In a revolution the economic foundations of society suffer a radical 
transformation. Then, the legal and political superstructure undergoes a 
profound change. In each case, the new, higher relations of production 
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have matured in embryo of the womb of the old society, posing an urgent 
need for a transition to a new social system” (Woods, 2013, p. 12)  
 
In the aftermath of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, riots and social unrests 
spread in the streets of some autocratic countries of the region. In Indonesia, angry 
protestors brought down Suharto’s regime after 30 years of political authoritarianism 
choke and economic deprivation. In 1979 the Middle East witnessed the rise of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran after a political revolution fueled by economic discontent, 
deprivation, corruption, and rising inequality (Heydarian, 2011). As Woods (2013) 
argues, “the viability of a given socio-economic system is determined by its ability to 
develop the productive forces” (P.15). Periods of economic crises define a country’s 
strengths and resilience. Economic policy choices favoring and fortifying productive 
sectors would definitely decrease the country’s vulnerability to external shocks by 
securing national resource ownership and strategic reserves (Malik & Awadallah, 
2011). Rent oriented governments, who usually happen to be linked to external market 
forces or outside political channels, are more likely to face political and social unrest in 
periods of crises (Cordesman, 2011). Too much reliance on trade and services increases 
the permeability of toxic economic assets to infiltrate local economies and spread spikes 
in prices, fiscal deficits, and then riots.  
The Arab Spring followed a similar path. The economic crises across the Arab 
region of the 1980’s opened the door to of international financial institutions to 
restructure the economies of states as described above. During that year, regional 
stability has been also affected by the war between Iraq and Iran. The economic 
implications right after were: retarded economic growth, more adjustments, 
liberalization, and privatization transforming the state from “paternalistic, welfare 
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oriented model into a regulatory minimalist entity” (Heydarian, 2011, p. 3). The 
international and regional dynamics of wars and crises shaped domestic politics in Arab 
countries.  
“Financial crises, mass unemployment and constant social and political 
upheavals turn many things upside down. What appeared to be fixed and 
permanent dissolves overnight and people begin to question things they 
always took for granted. This state of perpetual unrest is what prepares 
the ground psychologically for revolution, which in the end becomes the 
only option that is realistically imaginable; in order to see this practice 
one only has to look at present day Greece” (Woods, 2013, p. 34). 
 
Again, external economic and political linkages shake domestic markets, leading 
to increased fiscal policy implications and by consequence more distortions (Manfreda, 
2011). The current global financial architecture needs to be revisited as it is able to 
produce sequential crises whenever the center is hit (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 
2014)    
 
4.2.2 The Global Scene: The System On Fire 
In the aftermath of the Global financial Crises in 2008, and recently the Arab 
Spring in 2011, International development agencies started rethinking their literature, in 
an attempt to provide solutions and policy recommendations, to advance job creation 
(ILO & UNDP, 2012). Following the 2011 Arab uprisings, literature highlighted the 
need to rethink economic growth, questioning the productivity and inclusiveness of the 
models adopted for decades, and the reason why scholars missed it (Gause III, 2011; 
ILO & UNDP, 2012). In a statement made by the Director-General of the International 
Labor Organization, Guy Ryder, during Spring Meetings of the World Bank and the 
IMF in 2013, he stated that the global economy was not growing at a sufficient pace to 
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be able to create enough jobs to restore pre-crises employment levels. Further, more 
worries have been expressed concerning a fear of drifting into protracted slow growth 
rates. Ryder proposed a coordinated policy response by different development actors 
and governments focusing on infrastructure investment, increasing credit access to 
small and medium enterprises, fortifying social protection and safety nets, linking 
minimum wages with economic productivity and building the employability skills of 
the youth (Ryder, 2013). 
For instance, the policy set presented by the International Labor Organization 
recommends a classical resort to government spending whenever the economy enters 
into recession. Furthermore, an opposing view states that the current global capitalist 
system has no chances to recover and has entered into its “final phase of monopoly 
capitalism” (Woods, 2013, p. 5); big monopoly sectors governed by the bourgeoisie 
dictate society’s life which increases the existing disparities between classes (Amin, 
2011; Woods, 2013). The same applies to the Arab world, where neoliberal economic 
policies have privileged the few on the account of the majority of the population, 
leading to a mutation of a systematic anomaly called crony capitalism (Brynen et al., 
2012). The increasing disparity between societal class structures over the past thirty 
years has increased tension notably, where demonstrations filled the streets all over the 
world, but most notably in Europe and the United States (Greene & Kuswa, 2012). A 
huge discontent invaded the working classes during the past decade (Woods, 2013).  
“As state repression continues to evict Occupy encampments throughout 
the United States, the Occupy movement attempts to become an 
adaptable community of resistance . . . emphasizing the need to create, 
when possible, living, breathing alternatives to existing dominator 
institutions . . . while. . . practicing the art of resistance to oppression in 
all its forms. In Europe, Greek protesters have executed a two-day 
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General Strike and taken to Syntagma Square to denounce the troika of 
lenders—the European Commission, European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund.  Occupy Wall Street stands in solidarity 
with the Greek strikes and proclaims: From Athens to Oakland, the 99% 
have awoken—and we refuse to be sold out’’ (Greene & Kuswa, 2012, 
p. 272).  
 
The unemployed labor forces in light of the global crises are transformed into a 
dead weigh that will not disappear whenever the global economy recovers (Woods, 
2013). Further, the global economic system has entered into a phase of permanent, 
structural, and organic unemployment (Ryder, 2013). Yet, the system remains blind of 
this syndrome (Woods, 2013). From 2007 to 2013, 870 million men and women lived 
under the USD 2 global poverty line, global unemployment increased by 28 million, 39 
million lost their jobs, and a gap of 67 million jobs has been created (Ryder, 2013). Out 
of these numbers, 74 million were educated youth, and out of the 198 million 
unemployed, South Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa earned the highest 
percentages as per the International Labor Organization (Ryder, 2013).  
“The crises of Capitalism have its direct effects among the youth. 
Unemployment among young people is soaring everywhere. This is the 
reason for the mass student protests and riots in Britain, for the 
movement of the Indignados in Spain, the occupations of the schools in 
Greece and also for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, where about 75% 
of the youth are unemployed” (Woods, 2013, p. 7). 
 
Hence, the global financial crisis shaped two types of vulnerabilities: demographic 
(youth), and regional (developing countries) (Heydarian, 2011). The crisis exported 
outside its countries of origin, from the US, then the Euro-Zone, to the rest of the 
world; it trickled down from the international, to the regional, later on to the national 
level. Social unrest became deteritorial whenever triggered by economic causes 
(Greene & Kuswa, 2012).   
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4.2.3 The Regional Dynamics: Crises Spill Over 
Regions express an unstable geography of place because they can 
encompass sub-national, transnational, continental, and intercontinental 
configurations of people, territory and practices. Regions exist above and 
below the nation-state and should be approached relationally. Regional 
relationships conceptualize regions not as containers of people, places and 
practices, but as products of complex condensations of social relationships, 
of varying density and variety, which combine contingently in specific time-
place couplings to produce what are… unique regions. Put differently, 
regions are rhetorically drawn into maps of power as actors, objects, and 
techniques of governance. For example, the Arab Spring names a regional 
relationship of protest and repression that stretches from the West coast of 
North Africa to Iran and Southwest Asia (Greene & Kuswa, 2012, p. 273). 
 
The global financial crisis exposed the economies of the developed countries. 
The crisis generated overseas affected the rest of the world through different channels. 
In other words, developing countries paid for a sin they did not commit. On a wider 
scale, and in the developed world, increasing unemployment rates, debt traps, and 
overproduction led to demonstration across different countries (Woods, 2013). In the 
United States Occupy Wall Street social movement shook public opinion and put 
pressures on the American administration (Greene & Kuswa, 2012). The case in the 
Arab World is not the same since a more complex version of the governing economic 
system is merged with authoritarianism. Demonstrations in Europe, the US, or 
elsewhere, even if sometimes shut down brutally, decreased social turmoil (Greene & 
Kuswa, 2012). In the Arab World, the situation has reached a point where no possible 
absorption of these pressures was allowed (Amin, 2011). This led to the combustible 
mix that later exploded in the Arab Spring (Kuhn, 2012). Kuhn (2012) and Woods 
(2013) explain the dynamics of the transfer of crises from the country of origin to the 
rest of the world: global channels such as trade, aid dependency, and governance 
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networks infiltrated overseas countries. Woods (2013) summarizes the dilemma of the 
current global capitalistic system as follow:  
“If Europe and the USA are not consuming, China cannot produce. If 
China is not producing at the same pace as before, countries like Brazil, 
Argentina, and Australia cannot continue to export their raw materials. 
The whole world is inseparably interlinked. The crises of the euro will 
affect the US economy. Thus globalization manifests itself as a global 
crisis of capitalism” (Woods, 2013, p. 9).  
 
Hence, within mechanics of the global capitalistic markets associated with the world’s 
leading democracies there is no room for the developing world in this equation. 
Moreover, how would it be if neoliberal economic policies have been adopted under 
authoritarian governance? The scene is simply an exclusion of the poor, middle and 
sometimes selected upper social classes (Amin, 2011). It will mutate a stagnant, 
inefficient, and highly corrupt model that will fall apart later. The collapse will start 
when the social fabric of these societies weakens (Joffé, 2011).  
The Arab region is highly interconnected with the global capitalistic system, 
where countries adopt neo-liberal economic models (Malik & Awadallah, 2011). The 
transformation started decades ago when the political systems were built on a set of 
economic policy choices favoring greater emergence into single global markets. 
Governance systems institutionalized social and economic inequalities. “Though many 
factors are contributing to the historic changes that are sweeping across the region, a 
combination of decades of aggressive economic liberalization and political repression 
has played a crucial role in mobilizing the masses against the hand of autocracy” 
(Heydarian, 2011, p. 1). Hence, popular uprisings have been a function of economic 
malpractice under authoritarian ruling; unemployment, inequality, and the youth bulge 
were the main determinants of the masses for new political aspirations (Heydarian, 
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2011; Kuhn, 2012). Social contradictions fueled by competition over resources between 
different structures would lead to conflict as per the Marxist approach. Hence, “this 
central contradiction can only be resolved by the radical overthrow of the existing order, 
and its replacement by new social relations that bring the economic base into harmony 
with the superstructure” (Woods, 2013, p. 12). This happened when the movements 
started shaking the grass roots of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and later Egypt. 
 
4.2.4 The Local Explosion: Trade off Economics 
The moment Ben Ali in Tunisia, Sadat in Egypt and later on Mubarak, assumed 
rule in both countries, foreign policy governance orientation shifted towards the West. 
In an attempt to gain international support, the presidents traded off egalitarian and 
welfare oriented systems for more open economies and deregulations throwing away 
the achievements of their predecessors (Heydarian, 2011). International financial 
institutions considered the two models as economic miracles, achieving impressive 
economic growth rates over a short period of time. Considered to be “faces of economic 
globalization in the Arab World” (Heydarian, 2011, p. 3), Tunisia and Egypt were the 
first two models to collapse in 2011. From being economic miracles according to the 
public information world’s leading financial institutions, economic liberalization in 
Tunisia and Egypt served ruling regimes to “institute a mafia like system that allowed 
favored cliques to dominate the tourism, real estate, and banking sectors” (Heydarian, 
2011, p. 3). 
 International financial institutions, and through politically driven policy 
directives, have minimized the role of the state in the local economy; the state hasn’t 
67 
 
played a central role in the regulation of industrial-trade policies to ensure sustainable 
industrialization and economic growth rates (Heydarian, 2011). Consequently, and 
regardless of positive growth rates achieved, the real benefits were not captured, 
resulting in high rates of unemployment and inequality. This fact questions the quality 
of the growth achieved, questioning the model adopted, as well as governance systems 
based on patronage and informal networks (Joffé, 2011). Economic liberalization in 
Tunisia and Egypt paltered the process institutionalized the control of certain sector 
over the state’s policy making, thus decreasing the state’s fiscal influence to cope with 
unexpected price increase of basic commodities (Heydarian, 2011). In 2007-2008, and 
in the aftermath of the global financial crises, Tunisian and Egyptian governments have 
the power to immunize their local economies against the sharp increase in food and 
other commodities prices (Malik & Awadallah, 2011; Öztürkler, 2013).  
 The Arab world shared the highest percentage of unemployment (including the 
highest among youth) as a region compared to the rest of the world; people below 30 
years of age represent 60% of its population (Amin, 2011; Heydarian, 2011; Kuhn, 
2012). Hence, the social prerequisite of any political revolution was present, though at 
the moment it is postponed in some countries, but in others the bill is already too high 
(Anderson, 2011). Performance indicators of non-productive sectors continue to worsen 
in Tunisia and Egypt as leakages still exist. Fiscal policy choices due to deregulations, 
privatization, and tax heaven systems have been always constrained (Heydarian, 2011). 
On top, the food security of the countries was decreasing and people became more 
vulnerable to hunger and poverty as import food subsidies decreased. “The recent 
global financial, food, and energy crises accentuated the failure of economic 
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liberalization to adequately spread the region’s wealth” (Heydarian, 2011, p. 4). 
Growing political opposition was rooted in this social and economic violence (Joffé, 
2011).  
“In Tunisia and Egypt, labor unions bridged the gap between the 
Facebook friendly middles classed and the broader disenfranchise 
masses. Economic desperation served as the rallying cry around which 
all sectors and classes coalesced. Similar grievances are continuing to 
fuel protests across the Arab world” (Heydarian, 2011, p. 5). 
 
It is claimed that the Arab spring uncovered the deficiencies of the economic 
model adopted in Tunisia and Egypt as well as the defections in the international 
economic governance system (Woods, 2013). At the country level, the main challenges 
that synthesized a social, and therefore a political upheaval are the following:  
“Persuasive corruption and lack of accountability and transparency; 
bloated public sectors with state-owned enterprises that crow out the 
development of private enterprise and investment; low levels of 
enterprise creation…a high dependence on fuel and food imports 
generating extensive exposure to commodity price volatility” ( 
O’Sullivian, Rey, & Mendez, 2011, p. 2).   
 
These challenges though structural and consistent, require a multi-stakeholder 
intervention (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014). Over the past two decades, the 
economic performance of Tunisia and Egypt as part of the MENA region synthesized 
the revolution over time. Although countries have achieved GDP growth, the real values 
did not trickle down because of rigid labor markets, absence of strong private sector 
with job creation capacity, skills mismatching, uncompetitive productive sectors, 
absence of export market diversification, and low intraregional markets integration ( 
O’Sullivian, Rey, & Mendez, 2011). The challenges of the overall region, the structure 
of the international financial architecture and the global governance system in light of 
successive crises needs to be revised. The outcome of this should be a new development 
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paradigm that takes into consideration the people’s need (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 
2014).       
 
4.3  The New Development Paradigm 
The Arab region, and more specifically non-oil producing countries, marched on 
steps drawn by the international financial institutions for the past three decades 
(Hydemann, 2010). Greece, a European neighboring country in the Mediterranean area, 
followed a similar path. Seven years after the global financial crises, and four years 
after the Arab Spring, a radical political change, yet democratic, has put a young left 
wing technocrat in power in Greece. Countries adopting the remedies of neoliberal 
economic models failed to provide social benefits and meet promises to their people 
(Amin, 2011). History teaches that a change triggered by economic deprivation is 
achieved political revolutions under autocratic regimes, and through ideological shifts 
translated inside election boxes under democracies (Woods, 2013). Yet, recovery and a 
move forward necessitate a more comprehensive review of outstanding models to 
anticipate a new one ( O’Sullivian, Rey, & Mendez, 2011; Schraeder, 2012). Further, 
George Joffé (2011) explains the following: 
“Economic models need radical revision if poverty and wealth 
distribution are to be significantly improved in the future. However, 
there is a little consensus as to how this should be done, even though 
viable models exist in the South East Asian and Chinese experiences. 
The result, therefore, is likely to be that the future unpredictability in the 
economic sphere will compound itself on the caution of policy-makers, 
so that aspirations for poverty reduction will be confounded” (Joffé, 
2011, p. 510). 
 
Moreover, the popular uprisings in the Arab region pushed United Nations 
development institutions to revisit their agendas as well as to develop a response 
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strategy to adapt the new situation. “An integrated response strategy to key 
development challenges was formulated with a new framework for action based on four 
inter-related priority areas: inclusive development, democratic governance, youth, and 
the humanitarian development interface” (ILO & UNDP, 2012, p. 9). Failed economic 
policies, their international linkages, and regional interconnectedness facilitate the 
derivation of important lessons from the Arab Spring.    
 
4.3.1 Lessons from the Arab Spring 
The interconnected social and economic dimensions of the popular uprising in 
Tunisia and Egypt should be the basis for any future development agenda 
considerations (Amin, 2011). The roots of deprivation should be addressed in a 
comprehensive and structured approach (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014). First, 
middle class, income distribution, poverty line, perceptions of social equity indicators 
such as GDP/Capita, GDP growth rates and poverty lines proved their limitation to 
measure social unrest (Cordesman, 2011). Hence, growth related indicators captured the 
nominal / numerical increase without touching upon the grass root level. This allows the 
questioning of the quality of the growth achieved, and at the same time the omitted 
social dimensions. Moreover, job creation processes in the Arab region are not 
sufficient and effective; this issue is better understood when linked to education systems 
that were completely delinked from employment strategy (Cordesman, 2011). 
Productive sectors, considered as labor intensive sectors being able to capture 
respectable proportions of the labor force, have been primitive and underdeveloped 
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(Malik & Awadallah, 2011). Agriculture for instance which are neglected, has a matrix 
of effects of the overall social and economic profile of a country:  
“Sharp rises in population pressures, and sometimes limits to water, 
increase land density or drive people out of agriculture areas. A lack of 
capital and modern farming techniques adds to the problem. Most 
countries lack effective government planning and services for the 
agricultural sectors and government actions and incentives often distort 
agriculture in ways that lower productivity and income” (Cordesman, 
2011, p. 5)  
 
Moreover, new governments should address the quality of governance systems to be put 
in place:  
“aid is pointless if it exceeds the capacity to use it effectively, and 
destructive and corrupting if I is misused. In practice, this means each 
Arab state needs to reexamine its own structure, the forces affecting its 
future, and develop plans and improved institutions to both use its own 
resources and outside aid more effectively” (Cordesman, 2011, p. 6) 
Hence, efforts should be drawn to build stronger and greener productive sectors, 
increase investment in labor intensive sectors to create more jobs, increase food 
security, rely less on external markets for import. To succeed, education reforms should 
be a top priority since suitable economic opportunities for a good educated population 
can decrease the likelihood of political instability (Campante & Chor, 2012).   
 
4.3.2 Learning from Experience: Linking to Opportunities 
The current international financial and economic system needs to be changed 
(ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014). There is a need for a new development paradigm 
to start from a rights-based approach (ILO & UNDP, 2012). International economic 
policy making should shift from a top down to a bottom up approach. Re-addressing the 
role of the state in the economy is at a great need in light of the collapse of “laissez 
faire” policies (Amin, 2011). For countries witnessing regime transition, a planned 
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economy could be a good resort. In this term, advancing social democracy, enhancing 
the role of the small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and protecting infant industries 
(Woods, 2013) are good gateways for countries witnessing high rates of unemployment 
and deteriorating social conditions. To do so national consultations and dialogues 
should be launched to gather consensus on policy formulation linked directly to the 
livelihoods of the people. These national dialogues are good opportunities for 
governments to hear from different stakeholders affected and involved directly by 
development plans (ILO & UNDP, 2012). Civil society, and due to its comprehensive 
nature overarching different actors, should be involved as a main development partner, 
a moderators, and a facilitator of an enabling environment for policy dialogue (ANND, 
ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014).  
Linking with international consultation processes is very important and crucial 
at the time being. The Post 2015 discussion is currently a good international dialogue 
window involving states, UN agencies, NGOs, private sector, and other stakeholders on 
how to link the millennium development goals launched in the previous decade with 
sustainable development goals at the global level. Ongoing consultations involve 
serious and comprehensive discussions around the current international economic and 
political system in attempt to propose a new development paradigm bridging the gap 
between developed and developing countries in light of current conflicts and crises. The 
global financial crises, the Eurozone crises, and the Arab Spring, has been pushing 
international process to forward the demands of social justice and socioeconomic 
reform claimed by the masses all over the world (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014).   
“The new development agenda must integrate transformative changes to 
global governance systems and to national policy choices in order to 
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achieve development and to overcome the challenges of inequality, 
exclusions, and vulnerability. This necessitates a shift towards a model 
centered on enhancing national productive capacities which require an 
enabling trade and investment architecture, a revision of the 
redistribution policies and the adoption of social policies that puts 
people’s economic and social rights at the forefront” (ANND, ESCWA, 
& ARADO, 2014, p. 1) 
 
The experience of Tunisia, Egypt, and even Greece more recently, suggest that 
whenever an economic model is revisited, there is a tendency among policy makers to 
omit indications of causes by looking into policy orientation only. Instead, policy 
makers should look at these adopted policies and analyses the extent to which and how 
it links with the current international globalist system (Joffé, 2011). A policy could be 
ambitious, yet it cannot move with the existing mechanics of the international system. 
From this perspective, “a democratization of global governance is a must” (ANND, 
ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014, p. 1), to open the door in front of developing countries to 
raise their voices and participate in policy making. At a regional level, reformed 
governance structures should advance and “enhance national productive and industrial 
capacities and collective regional production chains” (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 
2014, p. 2) as a basis for regional integration. International and regional processes 
should also be accompanied by a national level support for governments to revisits its 
role in development as an anchor, redistributor of wealth, and orchestrator of social 
cohesion and participation. At the end, this should rectify the major deficiency in Arab 
governance advancing economic liberalization over political reforms.          
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4.3.3 Towards a New Social Contract: Trade, Redistribution, and 
Social Protection  
 
In a hunt for an alternative system that addressees echo the needs of the masses, 
a socialist voice raises to oppose the current capitalistic global model: 
 “The alternative is a system based on production for the needs of the 
many and not the profit of the few; a system that replaces chaos and 
anarchy with harmonious planning; that replaces the rule of a minority of 
wealthy parasites with the rule of the majority who produce all the 
wealth of society” (Woods, 2013, p. 40).   
 
Amin (2011) agrees also on the above. Yet, this might sound utopian, yet the new 
model should lay somewhere in between. A greater role for the state in anchoring 
markets is definitely needed, but at the same time there is a need for a gradual reform of 
outdated state led development paradigms (ILO & UNDP, 2012). The alternative model 
should draw the patterns of a new social contract. This new model should capitalize on 
the positives of the old system, in an attempt to produce a hybrid one that puts at its 
heart a bottom up approach towards social benefits of the people across all sectors.  
Trade and investment for instance is one of the hot and old topics that have been 
always discussed throughout different international processes (Finance for 
Development, Sustainable Development, Millennium Development Goals, and recently 
the Post 2015 agenda). 
 “A crucial component of the new development model should be a 
reformed trading system and a shift from the decade-old conundrum, 
liberalization for the sake of liberalization, to a strategic integration 
concept: inclusive, sustainable, and redistributive growth” (ANND, 
ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014, p. 2) 
 
  The new social contract can be attained from investing in the national capacities 
of countries to produce sovereign income. Such a stage should be coupled with 
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redistribution polices. A new taxation system should be introduced “with tax equity at 
its center and as core component to address inequalities” (ANND, ESCWA, & 
ARADO, 2014, p. 2). An improved taxation system should be based on increasing fiscal 
transparency enforced by law, a progressive tax structure to ensure proper 
redistribution, and the abolishment of discretionary tax systems and heavens to 
minimize cross border evasions and avoidance (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014). 
 
4.4  Conclusion: from Challenges to Opportunities 
The experience of the Arab Spring at countries level will have two possible 
scenarios: first, if popular uprisings overthrowing regimes since 2011 can flourish 
democratic transitions in the longer term, a world scale rise against neoliberal 
economics will emerge, and second, if these revolutions will be aborted overtime, and 
the Arab region will miss the change of political and economic awakening, the future 
alarms a slip into an uncertain dead end (Amin, 2011: An Arab springtime?, 2011). For 
the moment, generalization about one general trend is impossible. Scenarios in the Arab 
region based on countries experiences are more reasonable hypothesis. Yet, a close look 
Tunisia and Egypt’s current political affairs, may allow assuming that some change has 
been happening. The elections held at both countries have produced new political 
outcomes but foreign policy orientations remained untouched.   
“Contemporary imperialism’s strategy for the region (the “greater 
Middle East”) does not aim at all at establishing some form of 
“democracy”. It aims at destroying the countries and societies through 
the support of so-called Islamic regimes which guarantee the 
continuation of a lumpen development i.e. a process of continuous 
pauperization. Eventual high rates of growth, praised by the World Bank, 
are meaningless, being based on the plunder of natural resources, 
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associated with fast growing inequality in the distribution of income and 
pauperization for the majorities” (Amin, 2012, p. 4). 
 
Although it may be too early to assess the impacts of newly formed government’s 
policies and anticipation of economic development, current political and security 
situations yet distort aspirations.  
The Arab Spring, and although some states have taken a violent turn, has forced 
the developed world to rethink development paradigms. The MENA region still has 
investment opportunities, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, as (1) youth represent a 
potential as a market and labor force, (2) renewable energy projects can develop a 
considerable economic activity, and (3) manufacturing, services, and agribusiness 
whenever linked into a strategic business model can localize a good economic benefit ( 
O’Sullivian, Rey, & Mendez, 2011). This time, local resources can be the building 
block of a strong model being able to achieve the aspirations of the current and future 
generations.        
In light of the above, a responsible engagement is requested from the 
international community to reshape the governance model as part of an overall 
development paradigm for the Arab Spring countries. The international community is 
demanded to engage as follow in order to mitigate the above mentioned risks: reorient 
development programs and provide technical assistance for social protection programs, 
strengthen domestic political stability through building strong institutions, and develop 
clear accountability structures to monitor progress (Schraeder, 2012). The review of the 
governance model, a component of the development paradigm should be also based on 
a rights based approach (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014) – “greater protection for 
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human rights such that individuals and groups at the bare minimum are able to lead 
lives free from state coercion or persecution” (Schraeder, 2012, p. 664).     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ECONOMICS OF REVOLUTIONS IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST: POLICY MODELS, UPHEAVALS, 
AND THE FUTURE  
 
 
5.1  The Underestimated Effect of Economic Policies 
The Arab Spring, and specifically the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, which were 
considered the economic miracles of the region, per the standards of the international 
financial institutions, exposed the limitations of the neo-liberal economic systems. The 
revolutions based on economic and social injustice caused by the inefficiencies of state 
led development paradigms forced international development agencies and governments 
to rethink, readapt, and redraw policies that respond to peoples’ needs. As an event, the 
Arab Spring was unexpected: it challenged the long standing political economic 
literature about the persistence of authoritarianism in the region. Hence, the Arab Spring 
went beyond the classical question of what went wrong in the Arab region: is it about 
the governance or development model? The Arab spring went beyond that to illustrate 
the deficiencies in the international financial architecture, global governance, and liberal 
economic models on a world scale. Woods (2013) argues the following:  
“In the 19th century, Liberalism, the main ideology of the bourgeoisie, 
stood (in theory) for progress and democracy. But neo-liberalism in the 
modern sense is only a mask that covers the ugly reality of the most 
rapacious exploitation; the rape of the planet, the destruction of the 
environment without the slightest concern about the fate of future 
generations. The sole concern of the boards of the big companies who 
are the real rulers of the USA and the entire world is to enrich 
themselves through plunder: asset-stripping, corruption, the theft of 
public assets through privatization, parasitism: these are the main 
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features of the bourgeoisie in the phase of its senile decay” (Woods, 
2013, p. 13). 
 
Woods describes an actual scenario of the mal functioning of neo-liberalism and its 
tendency to control the resources of the most. This chapter sums up the economic 
argument of the Arab Spring, and reflects on the policy implications of a necessary new 
development paradigm.  
Neoliberal economic policies brought harsh effects even on the worlds’ 
developed economies. Security and stability is also an issue to tackle whenever 
revisiting global governance. Increasing inequalities between nations, poverty, and 
competition on resources would threaten global security and hence trickle down to 
regions and countries in a highly connected world. National sectorial transformations 
are needed to create a new social contract based on redistribution and social protection. 
Lessons derived from the Arab Spring should be learned at the global scale:  economic 
growth is not enough. 
 
5.2  Tunisia and Egypt: Economic Downturn and Revolutions  
Tunisia and Egypt were living examples of failed state-led development 
paradigms. The economic policy choices of both countries were largely influenced by 
the recommendations of international financial institutions after the liberalization 
period. Political calculations, leading to crony capitalism facilitated the control of the 
few over key income generating sectors. Since the 1970’s, both countries’ economies 
were subject to external shocks. International, regional, and national crises were 
generated, severely affecting the fiscal balances, distorting markets, and pushing 
vulnerable populations towards poverty gaps. 
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Despite achieving progress on Human Development Indexes, some positive 
economic growth rates, and sustainable development was not attained. Market 
dynamics were not able to cope with successive crises and increased political 
instability. This was mainly due to weak national productive sectors producing income 
at the local level, and unable to absorb large pools of unemployed labor forces. 
Moreover, the youth bulge represented another threatening agent to regime stability. 
Inefficient markets, a weak public sector, and limited private sector, were not able to 
produce enough jobs to accommodate educated youth.  
Beyond markets, the domestic economies of Egypt and Tunisia were heavily 
reliant on external revenues: remittances and foreign aid. The global financial crises 
that hit the world’s most advanced economies trickled down to the poorest developing 
nations: remittances in Tunisia decreased sharply in the aftermath of the crises and so 
foreign aid volumes to Egypt. The overall result was increased vulnerabilities of 
domestic economies, chronic fiscal deficit, increased unemployment rates and weaker 
social cohesion. Angry Tunisians and Egyptians were fuled by poverty and 
unemployment which overthrew two of the most aging regimes in the region. Protests 
launching from economic deprivations became international in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring. ‘People Want’, became a slogan for protestors in Europe and the United 
States. Ideas of the Arab Spring emerged back through globalized networks.  
In light of successive economic crises that drive the global market into chronic 
recessions, revisiting the international financial architecture is a must. This entails 
revisiting the global governance systems that define the political context of aid, trade, 
development, and humanitarian assistance. International organizations, regional 
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entities, and governments in the developed world are striving to stimulate the global 
economy to produce more jobs with growing fears to enter into a chronic stagnant 
negative growth. In light of these fears, the existing global governance system, the 
exaggerated role of markets, and economic standardization should be tackled within a 
comprehensive and transformative reform plan. This should be the starting point of an 
aspired new development paradigm that puts social justice and fairness in the forefront. 
 
5.3  Beyond the Arab Spring: Policy Implications and 
Recommendations  
 
The lessons of Arab Spring countries are simple. The social justice deficit needs 
to be addressed in two areas: (1) rethinking the failure in achieving the aspirations of 
Arab citizens, and social services due to pro-market adjustments and reforms adopted 
since 1990s, and (2) the great shortage of social protection and dialogue (ILO & 
UNDP, 2012). Governments, development institutions, and donors should focus efforts 
to bridge this gap in the aspired development paradigm of the region. Liberalization 
without democratization, or more practically, economic reforms preceding political 
reforms has been proven to be a false practice in the Arab region. Reforms should be 
launched hand in hand to achieve tangible results.  
Inclusive growth that yields to economic development should balance social, 
cultural, and environmental advancement environmental advancement to be considered 
as sustainable development (ESCWA, 2012).  This entails going beyond the extractive  
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rentier approach, towards building egalitarian productive models being able to fulfill 
the needs of citizens.  
Past reforms introduced in the Arab region were too optimistic. Public finance 
policies crafted to stimulate growth did not fit the actual reality of local economies, and 
drew unattainable goals especially for the private sector. Economic policy reforms to 
suit the new development paradigm should engage with the private sector, and different 
stakeholders through Public Private Partnerships (ANND, ESCWA, & ARADO, 2014). 
This fortifies the accountability framework towards the citizens, and increases 
efficiency of delivery. Economic diversification was applied in a slow pace (ILO & 
UNDP, 2012). Intersectoral linkages such as economic policy, rural development, food 
security, employment, educations and others were not taken into consideration. Severe 
implications resulted with direct effects on employment, increasing the informality 
rates of the economy, and lastly affecting human development. As a result, economies 
produced ‘bad’ growth qualities resulting in job gaps. Skilled labor force and university 
graduates, especially women, were not able to find dignified jobs, resulting in increased 
pressure on governments. The new development paradigm should hence take into 
consideration gender sensitive and inclusive programs to ensure a wider participation of 
women and educated youth in local economies (ILO & UNDP, 2012; ANND, ESCWA, 
& ARADO, 2014). Lastly, improving the quality of education, in addition to 
establishing links with employment policies in necessary to modernize productive 
sectors, fortify safety nets, and capture the benefits of growth at the societal level.  
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In light of the Arab Spring, and in order not to miss this historical opportunity, 
future generations demand the international community, governments, and all 
stakeholders to rethink economic policy making. The Arab region today stands at a 
critical point: wars, terrorism, and internal conflicts diverge from the demands raised by 
the masses during the aspired 2011 spring. Aspirations towards democracy shall keep 
on rising despite recent events. At the end, democratic transitions are a work in 
progress, revolutionary and innovative at the same time.    
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